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INTRODUCTION

During the past twenty five years copyright holders have repeatedly preached the coming of the Apocalypse as new technol-

ogies for copying and distributing works became available.' VCR

spells doom for movie producers. 2 Photocopiers will ruin academic publishers.3 Digital audio tape means the end of the music industry 4 And so on.5 These prophecies mobilized lawyers
and lobbyists representing the publishing industry to push for
copyright expansion. They met resistance from representatives
of the consumer electronics industry, librarians, and other
groups opposed to copyright expansion. Sometimes concern
about technological innovation moved the courts or Congress to
expand copyright protection; sometimes not.6 Nonetheless, technological innovation consistently put copyright on the policy1. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHTS HIGHWAY 29 (1994).
2. See Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L.
REv. 19, 35 (1996).
3. See GoLDsmEIN, supra note 1, at 78-128.
4. See GOLDSTE-N, supra note 1, at 158 ("For record companies, the proliferation of
unending generations of flawless copies [on digital audiotape] spelled doom for the retail
sales market); see also Litman, supra note 2, at 36 (noting that compromise legislation
was required).
5. See Litman, supra note 2, at 22 (observing that personal computers, VCRs and
cable all stimulated debate about the scope of copyright law); id. at 42 n.93 (citing testimony that uncurtailed audio and video tape recording would cripple and ultimately destroy motion picture and television industries). A prime example of the flexing of the
movie industry's muscle is the delay of the introduction of Digital Versatile Discs (DVDs)
into the U.S. marketplace due to demands by the movie industry that DVD units incorporate strong copy protection. By threatening not to release their products to DVD, the
movie industry effectively held up introduction of DVD units for over a year. See Junko
Yoshida, Copy-protection questions delay digital roll-outs, ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING
TImEs, Feb. 3, 1997, at 1; Junko Yoshida, DVD: Last year's bang is now more a whimper,
ELECTONIc ENGINEERING TIms, Jan. 13, 1997, at 10. The flexibility of DVD as a delivery medium for the movie, music, and software industries led to the formation of a
multi-industry Copyright Protection Technical Working Group to decide upon standards
for the new DVD decks to protect intellectual property distributed on DVD discs. See
Movie Companies, Drive Makers Agree on Copyright Protection, OPTICAL MEMORY NEWS,
Nov. 5, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8328542.
6. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (no infiringement by videotaping); Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10
(1994) (barring infingement suits for digital audio taping); America Geophysical Union
v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding infringement by photocopying), order
amended and superseded by 60 F.3d 913 (2nd Cir. 1994); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's
Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding infringement by photocopying); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by an
equally divided Court 420 US. 376 (1975) (per curiam) (finding no infringement by photocopying); Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th
Cir. 1996) (en banc) (infringement by photocopying).
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making agenda and gave copyright holders an occasion to argue
for broader rights.
Copyright law is again convulsed by a new media technology, and copyright holders have again issued a familiar warning: the Internet and digital information transmission threaten
the survival of many publishers.7 Text, software, music, and
video publishers and producers have united to lobby for legislation to expand copyright protection of digital works. Copyright
holders voice two main complaints about digital technology: it
promotes widespread unauthorized sharing of digital works between a buyer and her" friends and family; and it promotes
piracy. Publishers prefer that each user of a digital work
purchase an original. Users often find it is convenient and economical to purchase a single original and share it within their
social group. Software publishers are especially vocal about the
effect of sharing on their profits; they claim to have lost substantial profit to widespread sharing that results from unauthorized copying.9 All publishers worry about pirates making cheap
and precise digital copies and easily transmitting the copies
throughout the world via the Internet. 10
Copyright advocates insist that it is good public policy to
protect the profits of the producers of digital works.' First, they
argue that fairness requires that authors and publishers should
be able to keep their share of the copyright pie in the face of
new technologies. 2 This argument is usually cast in terms of
the natural right of authors to reap where they have sown. Sec7. See Copyright Protection on the Internet: Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intell. Prop., 104th Cong. 84 (1996) (statement of Garry L. McDaniels, President, Skills Bank Corporation) [hereinafter McDaniels] available in 1996 WL
7135497. MThe easy reproduction of computer software, and the far-flung messaging capabilities of the Internet, have shifted the legal balance far away from copyright owners." Id.
8. I will use masculine pronouns for copyright holders and feminine pronouns for
users and competitors.
9. See Chuck Melvin, Pirates of the Cyber Age: Software Buccaneers are Thriving
and You May be One, Too, THE PLAIN. DFEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 20, 1997, at 5D (arguing
that in the software industry alone lost profits from unauthorized copying are estimated
to be $13 billion a year); Litman, supra note 2, at 30 (stating that an estimated one-half
of software copies are unauthorized). See infra text accompanying notes 165-70, 172-73.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 165-70.
11. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "InformationSuperhighway":Authors,
Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 Coi. L REv. 1466, 1468 (arguing that user
rights are secondary to the interests of producers); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1; INTELLEcTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE
WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995) [hereinafter WHrT PAPER].
12. See infra text accompanying notes 48-49.
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ond, they argue that profits from copyrighted works provide an
essential incentive to produce and distribute those works. 13 That
incentive would be undercut by the increased sharing and piracy
that is forecast to arrive with the growth of the Internet.
The Clinton administration has come to the defense of copyright holders. 14 A task force headed by Patent and Trademark
Office commissioner and former entertainment industry lobbyist
Bruce Lehman released a report known as the White Paper in
1995.15 The White Paper proposes a series of interpretations or
modifications of copyright law to increase protection for digital
works. Notably, the White Paper defends recent cases that limit
the first sale 16 and the fair use 7 doctrines as applied to digital
works. It also supports the use of contract law to displace the
fair use and first sale doctrines. 18 In the international realm
U.S. diplomats have also pushed for broader intellectual property protection for digital works. 19
Internet service providers and digital equipment manufacturers join consumer electronics firms and librarians in opposing
expanded protection of digital works. 20 The first two groups are
new to copyright policy-making disputes. They worry that
stronger copyright law will slow development of the Internet. In
particular, they oppose indirect copyright liability for service
providers which is favored in the White Paper.21 Generally, the
13. See infra text accompanying notes 50-53.
14. See Litman, supra note 2, at 21 (stating that the WHITE PAPER interprets copyright law in favor of copyright holders).
15. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10.
16. See infra Part I.C.1.
17. See infra Part I.C.2.
18. See infra Part I.C.3.
19. See Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REv. 299, 302 (1996).
A treaty proposed by delegates to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
would have included temporary reproduction of a work within the reproduction right of
a copyright holder. See Treaties: W1PO DelegatesScramble to Reach Agreement by lVeek's
End, 53 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 116 (1996) [hereinafter Treaties].This proposal
is directed at digital works that are stored temporarily in a computer for use. See infra
text accompanying notes 77-80. The final treaty was significantly modified to accommodate the wishes of users. Id. The proposed treaty also created an exclusive right of communication. But the final version made it clear that telecommunication companies that
merely provided a conduit for communication did not infringe this right. See News From
WIPO, Sept. 12, 1997, <http-//www.hrrc.orgnewswipo.html> (on file with author and the
Buffalo Law Review).
20. See Treaties, supra note 19. (noting that the WIPO proposal on temporary reproduction was strongly opposed by the U.S. Internet industry); Europeans Push for Copyrights in Cyberspace, New York Times, Oct. 20, 1997, at C6.
21. See Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1492; Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab,
HOT WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 8, available in <file://ibnet/libhtml/bison.html> (on file with
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critics of copyright expansion favor broad dissemination of digi-

tal works. 22 They argue that the status quo provides adequate
incentives to authors and publishers, and that enlarged protection of digital works would come at the expense of unfairly diminished public access to copyrighted material. Such access advances educational and free speech goals as well as legitimate
access to unprotected ideas concompetition by firms who 2gain
3
tained in protected works.
Academics and policy-makers have debated the proper copyright response to digital technology by assessing and balancing
issues of profit and access, but they have largely neglected what
24
should be a key issue in the debate: price discrimination. I
demonstrate that the proposed changes in copyright law facilitate the practice of price discrimination by sellers of digital
works. The neglect of price discrimination is curious because
raising the issue could advance the position of either side in the
debate. Proponents of copyright expansion could argue that facilitating price discrimination is desirable because it restores
lost profit to publishers and (as an appealing bonus) it promotes
economic efficiency. Opponents could argue that price discrimination has undesirable effects on the distribution of wealth and
(contrary to usual claims) it subverts both access and economic
efficiency.
I have two goals in this Article: first, to show that the
changes supported by the White Paper will facilitate price discrimination; and second, to show that those changes are not required to maintain the industry's profit share. I present the arauthor and the Buffalo Law Review). In contrast, the authors of the WHME PAPER contend that it would be "premature to reduce liability of any type of service provider in the
Ni environment." WHrE PAPER, supra note 11, at 122. Since the hassle of suing an individual customer may be too great, a small number of deep pocketed service companies is
an attractive target. The WHUE PAPER endorses cases that have found Internet service
providers are liable under a theory of contributory infringement for copying done by
their clients. Id at 140-53.
22. See Litman, supra note 2; Samuelson, supra note 21; Julie E. Cohen, A Right to
Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at 'Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CoNN.
L. REV. 981 (1996). See also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil
Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996) (comparing copyright expansionists and minimalists in
the digital context).
23. See supra note 22, at 288.
24. Some exceptions include PAUL GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 8 (explains that copyright is crucial for price discrimination by book and movie sellers); Netanel, supra note
22, at 293-94 nn.31 (noting that digital technology promotes price discrimination); Glynn
S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV.
483 520-21 (1996); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L.
REv. 1197, 1205 (1996).
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guments made by supporters of copyright expansion in Part I.
First, I explain the claim that digital technology threatens the
profits of copyright holders because of increased unauthorized
sharing and piracy. I move next to the normative arguments
stating that copyright expansion is an appropriate response to
falling profits. I conclude this Part by listing the proposals for
expanded copyright protection of digital works and explaining
how they might alleviate the problems of unauthorized sharing
and piracy.
Part II covers the mechanics of price discrimination. 25 My
first task is to explain how sellers price discriminate. Roughly
speaking, price discrimination is a tactic by which a seller
charges a high price to high valuation users and a low price to
low valuation users. Effective price discrimination requires satisfaction of three conditions: (1) the seller has market power; (2)
the seller can sort customers according to their preferences; and
(3) customers cannot arbitrage away price differentials. 26 In the
absence of market power a seller would find that competitors
would be eager to serve his disfavored customers and any price
differential would collapse. The seller must have information on
consumer preferences or he will not know who to discriminate
against. Arbitrage means that favored customers can buy in order to resell to disfavored customers. The presence of arbitrage
undermines price differentials. In most markets price discrimination is either infeasible or feasible only to a limited degree
since these requirements are not fully met.
My other task in Part II is to show how copyright law affects price discrimination. The exclusive rights granted to a
copyright holder are a source of potential market power that
make price discrimination possible. Thanks to copyright there is
a single authorized producer of MS-DOS software. If Microsoft
chooses to charge different prices to different buyers of the same
software, there are no competitors to woo the disfavored customers. Copyright law also contains features that hinder price discrimination. The first sale doctrine fosters indirect competition
by allowing the first buyer of a work to resell it. Resale is especially detrimental to price discrimination if a low valuation user
purchases a work at a low price and arbitrages by selling the
work to a- high valuation user. The fair use doctrine is another
25. In Part IH, I explain how price discrimination operates in the market for digital
works.
26. Sporadic price discrimination may occur under any market structure in response
to changing economic conditions and limited information. I am only considering persistent price discrimination.
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deterrent to price discrimination. For example, the fair use doctrine allows home recording of television programming. The
sharing of videotapes by friends and family works against price
discrimination because it makes it harder for sellers to sort customers into homogeneous groups. In contrast, the fortunes of
price discriminators may be bolstered by contract law. Resale
and sharing of works by users can be suppressed by contract
terms.
The conditions allowing price discrimination are not satisfied in many markets for copyrighted works. Even when the
conditions are satisfied, price discrimination does not follow inevitably. If the cost of implementing price discrimination is too
high, then uniform prices prevail. Further, when sellers practice
discrimination, the scope and complexity of discrimination is
limited by implementation costs. The law may facilitate price
discrimination by reducing implementation costs. Specifically,
constriction of the first sale and fair use doctrines and tolerance
of contractual displacement of copyright law reduces the measurement costs and makes arbitrage more difficult. Thus, expanding legal protection of copyrighted digital works will likely
increase the scope and complexity of discriminatory pricing
schemes.
Part III assesses the profit impact of unauthorized sharing,
piracy, and price discriminati6n. I argue that digital technology
and the proposed changes in copyright law work in a -complementary fashion to significantly raise the profits from digital
price discrimination. Briefly, the primary effect of digital technology on price discrimination is to make measurement easier.
The primary effect of the legal changes is to make arbitrage
more difficult.27 Together this is a recipe for higher profits. On
the other hand, I do not see great losses associated with unauthorized sharing or piracy if copyright holders fail to win their
desired changes in the law. The effect of sharing is overstated
because copyright holders point to lost sales instead of the relevant measure of lost profits. Sharing has a smaller effect on
profit than sales, and it is not clear how much digital technology
will increase sharing for works other than software. Also, both
sharing and piracy probably can be controlled by technology. To
further combat piracy an appropriate regime of copyright man27. I argue that digital technology and expansion of copyright law will have a variety of effects on measurement and arbitrage. In some ways digital technology makes arbitrage easier and in other ways harder. Copyright law changes will make measurement
easier in some cases as well as making arbitrage harder. The details are covered in Part
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agement could be implemented. A law that punished those who
tamper with copyright information attached to digital works
would help control piracy, but would do nothing to facilitate
price discrimination.
I.

FEAR OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND DEMANDS FOR COPYRIGHT

EXPANSION

A.

The Profit Threat from Piracy and Unauthorized Sharing

There are numerous activities that may infringe upon the
exclusive rights of a copyright holder, but in this Article I focus
mostly on two that I call piracy and unauthorized sharing.
These are not terms defined by copyright law, rather they are
terms I will use to define economically relevant categories of behavior. I use piracy to describe the unauthorized public distribution of literal copies of a copyrighted work, 28 and I use unauthorized sharing to describe the unauthorized private distribution
of literal copies of a copyrighted work. 29 In economic terms, a pirate is a competing supplier of the copyright holder, while parties engaged in sharing (whether authorized or not) should be
thought of as a c6alition of buyers. As the boundary between
public and private distribution becomes blurred unauthorized
sharing starts to look like piracy, and the organizer of a coalition of buyers begins to look like a competing supplier.30 I will
28. Piracy should be distinguished from competition by a close substitute. Absent
patent protection, competitors can learn ideas and imitate. See, e.g., Mark Lemley &
David O'Brien, EncouragingSoftware Reuse, 49 STAN. L. REV. 255 (1997); Dan Burk, The
Market for Digital Piracy, 205, 214, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND
THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (Brian Kabin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997)
(piracy and Internet distribution); Robert Merges, ContractingInto Liability Rules: Intellectual PropertyRights and Collective Rights Organizations 84 CAL. L. REv. 1293 (1996).
For the sake of brevity in this Article I only consider piracy of literal copies, but it
sometimes makes sense to include unauthorized public distribution of derivative works
in the definition as well. Some derivative works do not contain much added value. The
public distribution of unauthorized translations of a factual work or textbook or unauthorized anthologies might reasonably be treated as piracy. Cf Basic Books, Inc. v.
Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
29. A similar distinction is made by Litman, supra note 2, at 39-41, and Richard
Stallman, Reevaluating Copyright: The Public Must Prevail, 75 OR. L. REV. 291, 294
(1996).
30. Record and software rental stores are an interesting case. One could argue that
they are profit making libraries, or that they represent a coalition of buyers who share a
copyrighted work. It makes more sense to consider them pirates because the public nature of their distribution makes them effective competitors to authorized sellers of
software or records. Such stores are precluded by Section 109 of the Copyright Act. Pub.
L. No. 101-650, § 804(b), 104 Stat. 5136, 8518 Dec. 1, 1990. On the other hand, video
rental stores flourish. What's the difference? People usually rent a movie or tape for a
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not bother to fix a clear boundary between these categories, because most of the cases I consider will clearly fall into one category or the other, and because it is not essential to my main
arguments.
Digital technology may expand the horizons of copyright
piracy but it does not change its nature. The traditional copyright pirate would obtain a copy of a novel, song, or movie, and
produce unauthorized copies of the work. She would then sell
the bootleg copies in competition with the authorized seller. Digital piracy amounts to the same thing except the digital pirate
might avail herself of the Internet for digital distribution of the
bootleg copies. An example of piracy on the Internet is provided
by Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA.31 In that case the defendant
made unauthorized copies of Sega games available on a computer bulletin board where users could download the games for
a fee.3 2 Besides the profit seeking pirates that have always
plagued publishers, the Internet creates a genuine risk of piracy
without profit. 3 A disgruntled employee might distribute proprietary software to get back at an employer, or a teenage hacker
might decode and freely distribute a game. 34 The low cost of distributing copies on the Internet makes mischievous or malicious
piracy possible.
Copyright law must stop direct, unauthorized competition
because it can wipe out the profits of the copyright holder.35 A
pirate distributing copies over the Internet puts pressure on the
copyright holder to cut his price. If the pirate can reach much of
the market for a work through the Internet, then the market
price will plummet to the marginal cost of storing and transmitsingle viewing and are less inclined to copy a movie. People usually use software and
music repeatedly and want their own copies. Further, the Macrovision copy prevention
system is effective in stopping home copying of rented videos. There is no equivalent system for software and records.
31. 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
32. Compare Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (stating
that the defendant claimed he did not know the material was infringing unlike
MAPH!A).
33. See Andrew Sorkin, Internet Song Use Spurs Recording Industry Suits, N.Y.
Tims, June 16, 1997, at D6 (stating that most virtual bootleggers of music do it as a
hobby); United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994) (bulletin board allowing people to get unauthorized copies of software at no charge).
34. Cf Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Ina,
907 F. Supp. 1361; (N.D. Cal. 1995) (the defendant made excerpts of letters available free
of charge for anyone to download or browse from his web page).
35. See Litman, supra note 2, at 42; Michael D. McCoy & Needham J. Boddie HI,
Cybertheft: Will Copyright Law Prevent DigitalTyranny on the Superhighway?, 30 WAKE
FoREsT L. REv. 169 (1995).
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ting the digital work (a cost close to zero). Absent a suitable
lead time in marketing, 36 the copyright holder will be unable to
cover the fixed costs of producing the original work. 37 The disgruntled employee or teenage hacker might be a more serious
problem assuming they make the work freely available, putting
even more downward pressure on the price charged by the copyright holder. The problems of the copyright holder are compounded by the possibility that third parties on the Internet
might speed distribution of unauthorized copies of a work by
creating links, posting information about the work, or actively
redistributing the work themselves." The best argument for expanding copyright protection of digital works builds on these
fears.39
Sometimes the term piracy is used to cover what I call unauthorized sharing. For example, the Software Publishers Association defines software piracy as unauthorized copying of
software.40 This definition includes both the mass marketing of
unauthorized spreadsheets and the unauthorized copy of a computer game that one friend gives to another. I prefer a narrower
definition of piracy to distinguish it from unauthorized sharing
because they are such different activities.
Sharing of copyrighted works is commonplace. Most buyers
share any works they purchase within their home. Buyers often
lend novels, sheet music, and videotapes to their friends. Parents teach songs, poems, and stories to their children. Magazine
and newspaper buyers photocopy or clip articles and give them
to friends. Music, video, and software buyers sometimes copy a
work and give it away; they also lend a work knowing it will be
36. See, eg., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright, 84 HARv. L. REv. 281,
299-300 (1971) (noting that the lead time advantage and strategic pricing are sufficient
to give a publisher enough incentive to introduce a new work).
37. See Netanel, supra note 22, at 292, n.27. Fixed costs include selecting, editing,
typesetting, and some one-time marketing and distribution costs. See Keith Aoki, Foreword: Innovation and the Information Environment: Interrogatingthe Entrepreneur,75
OR L. REV. 1, 11 (1996).
38. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to
Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CAnozo ARTS & ENT. LJ. 215, 284-85 (1996).
39. Besides direct competitors, the copyright holder cares about other kinds of competitors. There are: imitators, who may copy a work to extract ideas from the work that
improve their ability to make and sell a similar product; creators of derivative or transformative works; and secondary market competitors, who copy a work so that they can
compete with the copyright holder in a secondary market related to the copyrighted
work, for example, maintaining software. Expansion of the rights of copyright holders
are also designed to limit competition from these indirect competitors.
40. See Ken Wasch, Software Industry Gets Serious About Piracy, COMPUTER RESELLER NEWS, Nov. 7, 1988, at 140.
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copied. Institutions likes businesses and schools buy reference
books that are shared by employees or students. These institutions also photocopy copyrighted works and distribute the photocopies internally. Explicit authorization to share a copyrighted
work is not the norm. One important instance of authorization
is a site license for software that allows a purchaser to share ac41
cess to the software with a specified number of other users.
Most of the time sharing is either implicitly authorized or
unauthorized. 4 Copyright holders complain that unauthorized sharing cuts
their sales and hence their profits, and that digital technology
4 They claim that unauthorized
will make the problem worse.A
sharing will increase because new digital technology makes inexpensive and faithful copying technology available to the
masses. This argument is strongest with regard to digital text.
The appearance of the World Wide Web and other developments
in data transmission have created whole new markets for digital
text. Indeed, until recently, most text was available only in
print. Additionally, digital technology was not very relevant to
sharing text because it is much easier to photocopy and share a
printed work than it is to scan or manually enter text into a
digital file in order to make and share copies.4 Regarding audio
and video works, digital technology produces higher quality copies, but analog technology already produces reasonably good
quality copies, so the copying technology alone probably will not
increase unauthorized sharing very much. The sharing of
software is intrinsically a feature of digital technology. Sharing
software has been a common and favored practice from the early
days of computing. 46
Besides better copying technology, better data transmission
might also encourage more unauthorized sharing. Local networks at schools and workplaces make it easier to share
software. E-mail makes it easier to share digital files of any
type of work with distant friends and family members. If con41. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
42. An explicit ban on sharing is becoming an important feature of software licensing agreements. See Mark A- Lemley, Intellectual Property and ShrinkWrap Licenses, 68
S. CA L RaY. 1239 (1995).
43. See McDaniels, supra note 7 ("One out of every five consumers recently sur-

veyed admitted that they had copied software from friends at work or school... [Olver
$1 billion in business applications alone were pirated in the United States in 1994 from
all sources.. :).
44. See Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1478; Netanel supra note 22, at 299.
45. Netanel, supra note 22, at 299-301.
46. Cf. Stalman, supra note 29, at 294
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sumers grow accustomed to purchasing digital works over the
Internet they might also get use to sharing them over the
Internet.
B. Justification of Copyright Expansion
Proponents of copyright expansion advance two theories in
support of their position. The first is based on fairness and
holds that the relative profit shares of the groups affected by
copyright law should not be altered by technological developments. The second is based on economic efficiency and holds
that incentives must be maintained to produce copyrightable
works. 47
Copyright holders sometimes argue that they are entitled to
their current share of the surplus generated by the production
and distribution of copyrighted works.48 This argument derives
from the view that legislation should be seen as an agreement
among affected parties about how to share the surplus from
some regulated activity. The entitlement claim can be supported
by reference to the series of (perhaps hypothetical) legislative
bargains determining the content of the Copyright Act. The provisions of the Act help determine the share of surplus that flows
to copyright holders. They argue that the Internet threatens to
reduce their share and copyright law should respond to offset
that reduction.49
The more common argument in support of copyright expansion is based on the theory of public goods.50 Copyrighted works,
like other kinds of information, are classified as public goods by
47. The expansion of copyright protection of digital works might have quite a different explanation. Instead of a response to developments in digital technology, the expansion might simply be part of a general expansion of copyright. The general expansion of
copyright is explained by concerns about competitiveness and property rights. Many policy-makers argue that expanded intellectual property rights subsidize high-tech industries and promote economic growth. See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 156-57 (1992). A
complementary view holds that the broadest possible property rights provide the best
support for a competitive and efficient economy. Goldstein, supra note 1, at 178-79; see
also Wendy J. Gordon, Assertive Modesty: An Economics of Intangibles, 94 COLUn. L.
REv. 2579 (1994) (discussing theories of optimal protection of computer software).
48. See Litman, supra note 2, at 25. Alternatively, copyright holders argue that according to a Lockean natural rights theory they are entitled to as much of the surplus as
they can appropriate with the help of the law. On this view copyright should give copyright holders the broadest possible property rights. See Jaszi, supra note 19, at 301-03.
Users are less well organized and have not been very effective protecting their rights
from adverse effects caused by new technology.
49. See EDwARD ZAJAC, THE PoLmcAL EcoNoMY OF FAiRNEss 121-23 (1995).
50. See generally JEAN-JAcQuEs LAFFONT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PUBLIC GOODS (1988).
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economists. One characteristic of a public good is that the producer of the good has difficulty charging others to use the good.
In the absence of a copyright an author would make little profit
from his novel or other work because of the actions of free riders. 51 Free-riders misappropriate a market created by the copyright holder. They take a free-ride on the effort exerted by the
author to create a work and the publisher to edit, produce, and
market the work.52 Following the public goods theory, copyright
creates a property right of sufficient duration and scope to provide an incentive to authors and publishers to produce new
works despite the looming threat of free riders. 53 Effective copyright protection thwarts unauthorized competition and preserves
market power for the copyright holder. During the term of the
copyright free-riding is illegal. Once the copyright expires and a
work falls into the public domain,
however, anyone can sell the
54
formerly copyrighted work.

This incentive goal clashes with another goal of the copy51. Even without copyright protection there are incentives to produce works of authorship. The first publisher of a work will enjoy a lead time advantage over competitors
that provides some profit. Some kinds of works are protected as trade secrets or by technology. Some works are funded on a contractual basis.
52. See Aoki, supra note 37, at 11.
53. Positive and negative effects arise in relation to productive incentives. An optimistic view is that price discrimination raises profits and promotes additional investment in quality works of authorship. A pessimistic view is that price discrimination generates profits that are dissipated via nonproductive rent-seeking. Supporters of price
discrimination by copyright holders argue that it will increase the incentive to produce
copyrighted works. A related but more subtle argument is that widespread price discrimination would allow various authors and publishers to more nearly capture the full social value of copyrighted works which would encourage a better allocation of productive
effort to those works generating the highest social value. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at
178 (1994) (explaining that the broadest copyright assures that authors get the largest
possible share of the value they create, eliminating distortions in investment decisions
among possible copyrightable works). Skeptics argue that the increased profits from
price discrimination may cause too much investment in copyrighted works. Excessive investment might be directed to particular entertainment projects like blockbuster movies
or to duplicative factual works like popular software application programs. See Netanel,
supra note 22, at 333-35; Lunney, supra note 24, at 655-56. Other forms of unproductive
rent-seeking include lobbying and litigation. See generally Richard Posner, ECONOMIC
ANALysIs OF LAw 260 (1986) (explaining the efficiency effect of price discrimination is indeterminate. Even perfect price discrimination might be inefficient because it creates
bigger rents that may be offset by wasteful rent-seeking).
54. Instead of copyright the government could use prizes or other payments to support the production and distribution of works of authorship. Such incentives are already
used to a limited extent. The federal government provides grants through organizations
like the NSF, NIH, NEA, and NEH. Also universities support authorship through salary
and grants.
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right system: broad and rapid dissemination of works.5 5 Perpet-

ual and maximally broad copyright protection is the surest way
to provide incentives to produce and distribute new works, but

such a strong property right would impede dissemination.
Strengthening copyright protection increases the market power

of the copyright holder which leads to super-competitive prices.
High prices cut demand and restrict the dissemination of copyrighted works. An optimal copyright policy must balance the incentive and dissemination goals by making the right choices for
scope and length.

With regard to the Internet, copyright holders argue that
their productive incentive should be increased by copyright expansion to offset the harmful effects of the new technology on

profits.5 6 A key implicit assumption in that argument is that the
original balance was close to optimal (or that the original incen-

tive was too small) so Congress or the courts should act to re57

store it.
There are many objections to both of the theories supporting copyright expansion. 58 In this Article I will challenge them
in detail on only one point. Both the fairness and efficiency the-

ories posit that digital technology will significantly cut profits
through unauthorized sharing and piracy unless copyright law

is changed. I argue that sharing and piracy will not be significantly greater in the digital world and that the net effect of new
technology actually will be to increase the profits of publishers
even without major changes in copyright law.
55. Non-rivalrous consumption is the second characteristic of public goods. See LAFFONT, supra note 50. This means that increasing the number of consumers of the good
does not impair the utility derived from consumption of the good by the original consumers. The significance of this characteristic is that the efficient price of information is the
cost of transmission which is close to zero. Thus, there is a tension inherent in copyright
between responding optimally to the free-rider and to non-rivalrous consumption. Economists refer to this as a trade-off between dynamic and allocative efficiency.
56. They also argue the threat of widespread infringement justifies adoption of technical measures to control and track copying. See infra text accompanying notes 185-212
and 223-35. See also Cohen, supra note 22, at 984.
57. See Litman, supra note 2, at 32 (hard to determine the right incentive).
58. Limits on copyright law foster the development of new media technologies. See
eg. Litman, supra note 2, at 27. Other important incentives to produce works of authorship exist as well. Id. at 28-29. Unauthorized sharing contributes to the dominant position of some types of software. Id. at 30. The legislative bargain over copyright is not
fair because no one bargains for the public. Id. at 35.
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C. Proposed Expansion of Copyright Protection of Digital
Works
Sharing and piracy-get different treatment from proponents
of increased protection of digital works. The piracy problem is
addressed mostly through legal changes that support more effective enforcement of existing rights. In contrast, the problem of
unauthorized sharing is addressed mostly by expanding the
rights of copyright holders and constricting the rights of users.
The difference in treatment is natural considering that
piracy is squarely covered by existing law, 59 but unauthorized
sharing is often exempted from copyright liability. For example,
the first sale doctrine permits a purchaser to share a magazine
sequentially with several friends.60 In addition, the fair use doctrine sometimes permits an educator to photocopy a magazine
article and share the copies with students in class. 61 In contrast,
if a firm subscribes to a magazine and a manager at the firm
photocopies the entire magazine and distributes the copies to
other managers such sharing constitutes copyright infringement.
Whether unauthorized sharing is characterized as infringement depends on the treatment of personal copying and the
scope of the personal use rights reserved to the public. Personal
use rights are not precisely defined in copyright law; they include reading, listening, viewing, personal copying, private display, and transfer of a copy.62 The rights may apply to home
users, librarians and library patrons, and institutional users
like employees of a business, government, nonprofit organization
or other institution. Some of these uses are commercial and public, but none of the users engage in activities that make them
suppliers in competition with the copyright holder. Personal use
rights derive from the first sale doctrine (section 109) and the
fair use doctrine (section 107) of Copyright Law. Some argue
that personal use rights might also arise from a restrictive reading of section 106 which defines the exclusive rights of the copyright holder. One theory holds that personal use amounts to a
de minimus violation of section 106 rights; another theory holds
that enforcement against home use comes at too high of a pri63
vacy cost.
59. Under the reproduction right 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) and the distribution right 17
US.C. § 106(3).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 67-75.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 81-95.
62. See 2 PAuL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 5.1 (2d ed. 1996).

63. See Netanel, supra note 22 at 299. In addition, some personal use rights might
be attributed in part to § 102(b) which assures the public the freedom to copy un-
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The area of personal use rights is ill-defined in copyright
law because in the past copyright holders rarely found it worthwhile to litigate small scale infringement of their claimed rights.
But the recent developments in media technologies have
64
prompted copyright holders to pay more attention to sharing.
The general approach of proponents of copyright expansion is to
limit personal use to control sharing. 65 Their proposals are overbroad. The reader should note in the following description of the
proposals that many are directed
at purely individual behavior
66
that does not result in sharing.
1. The First Sale Doctrine. The first sale doctrine authorizes a purchaser to dispose of a copyrighted work by resale, gift
or lease.6 7 Conversely, the doctrine precludes a copyright holder
from restricting distribution of a work once it is sold. 6 Some
commentary suggests that the first sale doctrine also protects
copyrightable elements of a work.
64. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 130. Privacy concerns militate against copyright
enforcement against personal users, but "cheap, fast photocopies [and] new audio and
video technologies have made copying possible where it was impossible before, [as a result] the risk has grown that 'private' copies will displace retail sales and rentals of the
authorized originals from which publishers, record companies, and motion picture producers earn their revenues." Id. Private copying by video and audio tape has growing economic importance. See Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1478.
65. See America's Libraries Call for Caution at the InternationalCopyright Negotiations for the Digital Age, 5 AM LaRl ASS'N WASH. OFF. NEwSUNE (ALA) No. 86 (Dec. 9,
1996) ("Before international copyright negotiations at the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) began December 2, America's five major library associations urged
US. delegates to reconsider their positions and not to negotiate on issues on which there
is no consensus ....
As drafted, the proposals would inhibit browsing on the World
Wide Web; significantly increase exposure of online service providers-including libraries-to copyright infringement liability; restricting copying currently permitted by law
and impose liability on manufacturers of lawful machines that can be used for illegal
copying (e.g. personal computers and VCRs); potentially undermine the Fair Use doctrine and related exceptions created by Congress in support of education and library activities and undermine the long standing U.S. tradition of protect content, not facts.")
66. Another reason that copyright holders would like to restrict personal use has to
do with Internet service providers. An action for indirect copyright infringement against
an Internet service provider depends on a finding of direct infringement by a customer
of the provider. See Goldstein, supra note 62, at § 6.3.1.2. Expanding the scope of copyright vis-A-vis noncommercial users makes it easier to prove indirect infringement. See
generally LIANG, PRACTISING LAw INSTITUTE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (1995).

67. The leading case on the first sale doctrine is Bobbs Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210
US. 339 (1908).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994) codifies the first sale doctrine.
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private display and personal copying. 69 It is limited by statutes
that restrict rental of software 70 and sound recordings. 7 1 In addition, the doctrine can be skirted
if the copyright holder leases a
72
work instead of selling it.
Two recent copyright amendments cut back on the first sale
doctrine, but still express a healthy regard for personal use
rights. The record rental and the computer software rental
amendments of 1984 and 1990 succeeded in stopping the kind of
retail rental that exists for videotape. Section 109(b) bans unau-

thorized commercial record and software rental, 73 but Congress

exempted most software transfers by nonprofit educational insti-

tutions and lending of records and software by nonprofit libraries for nonprofit purposes.

74

Furthermore, certain transfers

within a for profit business might also be exempt. 75 Importantly,

in these amendments Congress distinguished free-riding compe-

tition by retailers from personal use. The piracy by the rental
stores was stopped but private sharing was not impeded.

Proponents of copyright expansion push for further limits
on the first sale doctrine that will obstruct sharing of digital
works. 76 They have an attractive case because simply reading
digital material requires making a transitory copy in a computer's random access memory 77 One court 78 has held that such
69. See Litman, supra note 2, at 21 (private performance, display and resale have
always been outside copyright protection).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (1994) prohibits a buyer from renting software for profit.
71. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1994).
72. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 62, at § 5.6.1. But see id. § 5.5.2 (If an artist lends a
work to an institution for private display, the borrower is permitted to lend the work to
an employee for private display).
73. See id. § 5.6.1.
74. See id. § 5.2.1.
75. See id. § 5.6.1.
76. See Litman, supra note 2, at 24. ("Under one controversial view of the copyright
statute, most of the activity that takes place over the Internet, and much of the activity
that takes place in individuals' homes when they turn on their computers, cannot lawfully be engaged in without the authorization of the copyright owner in the material
they see, hear, read, listen to or view.")
77. See Litman, supra note 2, at 21.
78. MAI v. Peak Sy&, 1995 WL 836331 (N.D. Cal. 1995). But see Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368
(N.D. Cal. 1995). MAI did not address the question raised in this case: whether possessors of computers are liable for incidental copies automatically made on their computers
using their software as part of a process initiated by a third party. Id. Netcom correctly
distinguishes MA! on the ground that Netcom did not take any affirmative action that
directly resulted in copying plaintiffs' works other than by installing and maintaining a
system whereby software automatically forwards messages received from subscribers
onto the Usenet, and temporarily stores copies on its system. Id. Netcom's actions, to the
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copying is infringement unless authorized by the copyright

holder or statute.79 If this approach is followed it will drive a
wedge between the first sale doctrine as applied to digital works

and the doctrine as applied to other types of works. Under the
first sale doctrine a consumer can lend a book, painting, or analog tape to a friend. When the friend reads the book, views the

painting, or listens to the analog tape no copy of the work is created. If these media are transformed to their digital counterpart, then when the friend reads, or views, or listens to the digital work a copy of the work is always created. For example, a
CD player temporarily stores a copy of the digital music recorded on a CD in the memory buffer of the player, and a com-

puter makes a similar temporary copy of a program or data input from a disk, CD-ROM or other source. 80
2.

The Fair Use Doctrine. The fair use doctrine excuses va-

rious copyright infringements in deference to competing policy
concerns. 81 Section 107 establishes a balancing test that weighs
the interests of the copyright holder against the private interests of the infringer and the general public interest in access to
information. Many types of personal use are sanctioned under
extent that they created a copy of plaintiffs' works, are necessary to having a working
system for transmitting Usenet postings to and from the Internet. Unlike the defendants
in MA!, neither Netcom nor Klemesrud initiated the copying. Id. "There is no logical
reason to draw a line around Netcom and Kiemesrud and say that they are uniquely responsible for distributing Erlich's messages. Netcom is not even the first link in the
chain of distribution-Erlich had no direct relationship with Netcom but dealt solely
with Klemesrud's BBS, which used Netcom to gain its Internet access. Every Usenet
server has a role in the distribution... ." Id. at 1372; Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern
Express Co., No. C 92 1539-FMS, 1994 WL 446049 (N.D. Cal. 1994), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part,64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1015 (1996).
79. Statutory authorization is found in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1996). See Goldstein, supra
note 62, at § 5.6.1 at 5:608 (Section 117 allows a purchaser to reproduce copies as "an
essential step in the utilization of the computer program").
80. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Issues Raised by the National In.
formation Infrastructure, PRACTTSING LAW INSTITUTE SECOND ANNUAL INsmlm FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw, Sept. 1996. (Digital Future Coalition seeks to amend Section
109 to assure that an owner can transfer a copy of a digital work as long as the original
is deleted at substantially the same time); Netanel, supra note 22, at 371.
81. 17 U.S.C § 107 (1994 & Supp. I 1996) codifies the fair use doctrine. It provides
an affirmative defense against a copyright infringement action. Fair use is made out by
establishing the use is equitable on balance in light of the following four factors: (1) the
purpose and character of the use, including its commercial nature; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the proportion that was taken; and (4) the effect of the copying on
the market. Notice that the fair use doctrine lends to a price differential-some users
pay zero while others pay a positive price. This is not equivalent to price discrimination
because the differential is not chosen by the seller.
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the doctrine, for example: library photocopying for medical research;8 2 photocopying by individual scholars;83 and videotaping

of television broadcasts.8 In the software context fair use arguably covers movement of a program from one machine to another,

modification of a program for the sake of compatibility, and
archiving of programs."'
The fair use doctrine may be constricted in the digital
world. A photocopying case, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco,8 6 offers a line of analysis that could easily be applied to digital copying. The defendants were research scientists working

for Texaco. They made photocopies of journal articles from journals purchased by Texaco and held in the company library. Texaco expected that personal photocopying by researchers would
be deemed a fair use even though it was in a corporate setting.

A decisive factor influencing the court to deny fair use was the
recent establishment of the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC),
an organization developed to collect license fees for photocopying. 7 The court said that the creation of the CCC created a mar-

ket for photocopy licensing.88 A fair use ruling would deprive
publishers of revenue from this new market. The case has been
construed to support the position that as transactions costs fall,
the scope of the fair use defense should shrink.8 9 Applied to a

82. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd 420 U.S.
376 (1975); Goldstein, supra note 1, at 85, 120 (library photocopying arguably had become a custom that should be accorded fair use treatment by the time of Williams &
Wilkins).
83. See GoLDsrEIN, supra note 1, at 85 (publishers and libraries reached an agreement allowing libraries to make photocopies for scholars).
84. See Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1479; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 158 (1994).
Consumers use VCRs to time shift and create a library. Id.
85. In addition to fair use, the provisions of section 117 offer safe harbors for personal uses of software. Section 117 limits the reproduction and derivative rights of a
software copyright holder. It allows the owner of a copyrighted program to make a copy
as an "essential step in the utilization" of a program and to make back-up copies. See
Goldstein, supra note 62, at § 5.2.1 (section 117 can be read to authorize a single corporate owner to allow many employees using a network to make copies for their networked
machines). Courts generally have not followed this reading. Section 117 also gives a
software owner the right to alter a program so that it will run on her machine. Id. at

§ 5.4.3.
86. 37 F3d 881 (2nd Cir. 1994), amended and superseded by 60 F.3d 913.
87. Id. at 896-97. Document delivery services are another new alternative. Id.
88. Id. at 898. See also Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc.,
99 F.3d 1381, 1387 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (market for permission fees for college
course-packs).
89. See Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1478; Jaszi, supra note 19, at 301-02; WHITE
PAPER, supra note 11, at 101. See generally, Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82

864

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

future Internet with digital commerce this development
portends a much smaller role for fair use.9° The Internet might
feature electronic libraries of text, images, video, and sound that
is accessible at posted prices for portions as well as complete
works. A portion could be taken and paid for with a few clicks of
a mouse. Since the transaction cost involved in excerpting from
protected works will be small, the fair use defense will fail.9 1 A
harbinger of this new regime is the creation of the Authors'
Union which is a copyright licensing cooperative modeled after
ASCAP and BMI. 92 It was created to improve enforcement of

copyright for digital versions of textual material. Digital technology also interacts with the fair use doctrine by increasing the
demand for copies of excerpts of protected works. This is especially true for multimedia authors who might borrow small excerpts of audio and visual as well as textual material. 93 A
greater demand for excerpts helps to cover the fixed transactions costs involved
in licensing such users and organizing the
94
Author's Union.
The fair use doctrine plays a major role in promoting or deterring unauthorized sharing. In some cases, copying that leads
to sharing is excused and in others it is not. In Sony v. Universal Studios, the Supreme Court exempted from copyright liability the act of making videotapes of TV programs that could be
shared with family and friends. In two photocopying cases, opposite results were reached. In U.S. v. Williams & Wilkins, the
Court exempted photocopying by a government library to inColum. L. Rev. 1600 (1982).
90. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 218-19 (Copyright holders can develop licensing
schemes to reduce transaction costs. Creating a fair use right undercuts the incentives
for the appropriate institutions to develop).
91. In an amended opinion the court softened its analysis by affirming that photocopying for personal use is still non-infringing. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco,
Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1994).
92. See generally Merges, supra note 28. The market for music licenses is largely
controlled by BMI and ASCAP. They license bars, restaurants, radio and television stations and others to perform copyrighted music. The standard license gives blanket permission to perform any music covered by BMrs or ASCAP's portfolio of copyrights. The
charge for a license depends on factors like the size of a bar or restaurant or the population served by the media station. These factors can be verified by BMI and ASCAP and
are positively correlated to buyers' valuations.
93. See generally Alfred C. Yen, Entrepreneurship, Copyright and PersonalHome
Pages, 75 ORE. L. R1y. 331 (1996) (Web pages creators often take unauthorized excerpts
from other Web pages).
94. See Samuelson, supra note 80, at 51. The Digital Future Coalition wants to
amend the Copyright Act to make it clear that the fair use defense still applies in a digital environment.
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crease the effective circulation of its journals, but in Texaco photocopying by a corporate library for the same purpose was not
allowed. If the reasoning in the more recent Texaco is followed
then personal copying for sharing and for strictly individual
purposes 95 will lose much of its protection under fair use.
Fair use also has an impact on piracy. Copyright expansionists would like to impose liability for browsing unauthorized material in order to chill the market for pirates. Many commentators have expressed concern that reading, viewing and listening
to digital works implicates the copyright holder's exclusive right
to make reproductions under section 106(1).96 The issue arises in
the context of the World Wide Web because a user browsing a
Web page makes a temporary copy of the digital information she
97
encounters on the Web page in her machine's screen memory.
9
3
MAI Systems Corp.. v. Peak Computer, Inc. holds that such a
copy is fixed and therefore appropriate subject matter for copyright protection. 9 Thus browsing becomes infringement unless it
is authorized. This may not be a problem now since the posting
of material on a Web page invites browsing and amounts to implicit authorization to browse. But a problem does arise if the
Web page contains unauthorized copies of digital works, and
many Web pages contain unauthorized text, photos, and
software. In those cases the creator of the Web page cannot authorize browsing.
Copyright expansionists believe that temporary copies
should be treated like other copies. 10 0 Personal use defenders
would reverse the holding in MAI Systems so that temporary
copies are not infringing. 10 1 Alternatively, they support broad
protection of temporary copying under fair use. Dicta in an in95. Sharing is only one aspect of personal use. Modification, archiving, choice of
field of use, browsing, and the creation of derivative works for personal use are also covered by personal use rights and also impinged by proposals for digital copyright expansion. The justification for cutting protection of individual acts is not to stop sharing. It is
consistent with the purpose of promoting price discrimination.
96. See Litman, supra note 2, at 45.
97. Exclusive rights over temporary reproductions would cover browsing the Internet, catching data during the operation of a telecommunications network, and copying
to memory buffers in a CD audio player. See News From WIPO, Oct. 2, 1997, <http'J/
www.hrrc.org/newswipo.html.> (on file with author and the Buffalo Law Review).
98. 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[P]eak's loading of copyrighted software into
RAM creates a "copy" of that software in violation of the Copyright Act.").
99. See Aoki, supra note 37, at 12.
100. See Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1476-79.
101. See Samuelson, supra note 80, at 51 (Digital Future Coalition sought amendments to section 106 that protect temporary copies made incident to an otherwise lawful
use).
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fringement action against an Internet service provider makes

the argument that browsing is fair use even when the reader

10 2
browses unauthorized copies:

The temporary copying involved in browsing is only necessary because
humans cannot otherwise perceive digital information. It is the functional equivalent of reading, which does not implicate the copyright laws
and may be done by anyone in a library without the permission of the
copyright owner. However, it can be argued that the effects of digital
browsing are different because millions can browse a single copy of a
work in cyberspace, while only one can read a library's copy at a time.
Absent a commercial or profit-depriving use, digital browsing is probably
a fair use; there could hardly be a market for licensing the temporary
copying of digital works onto computer screens to allow browsing. Unless
such a use is commercial, such as where someone reads a copyrighted
work online and therefore decides not to purchase a copy from the copyright owner, fair use is likely.103

3. The Copyright and Contract Law Intersection. Some
commentators believe that contract law is as important as copy-

right law in exploiting digital works. 0 4 The reason is that many
digital publishers contract around the first sale and fair use doc10 5
trines. The practice is common for mass marketed software.
Software companies insist that they license rather than sell
their products' 0 6-because of the shrink-wrap packaging of the
software these licenses are known as shrink-wrap licenses. Restrictive licenses that abrogate personal use rights are also negotiated in arms length transactions. License terms may preclude a buyer from doing the following to her software:
102. See Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services,
Inc., 907 . Supp. 1361, n.25 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("Additionally, unless a user has reason to
know, such as from the title of a message, that the message contains copyrighted materials, the browser will be protected by the innocent infringer doctrine, which allows the
court to award no damages in appropriate circumstances. In any event, users should
hardly worry about a finding of direct infringement; it seems highly unlikely from a
practical matter that a copyright owner could prove such infringement or would want to
sue such an individualf).
103. Id.
104. See Lemley, supra note 42, at 1239.
105. See, eg., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Every
box containing its consumer product declares that the software comes with restrictions
stated in an enclosed license. This license, which is encoded on the CD-ROM disks as
well as printed in the manual, -and which appears on a user's screen every time the
software runs, limits use of the application program and listings to non-commercial
purposes.").
106. See Lemley, supra note 42, at n.23 (Microsoft chooses to license rather than
sell all of its software to defeat the first sale doctrine.).
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transferring, sublicensing, leasing, copying, modifying, migrating, translating, disassembling, decompiling or converting to another programming language. 1 7 Some of these terms are de-

signed to block software sharing or discourage piracy, but other
terms appear designed to control strictly individual uses. 0 8

The legal foundation for copyright license restrictions is not
completely secure. The chief issue is whether and to what extent

federal copyright law preempts licenses effectuated through

state contract law. 0 9 The limited case law has been mostly hos-

tile to the enforcement of shrink-wrap license terms.

10

They

have been voided on grounds of preemption and also because of
failure of mutual assent or based on a policy against adhesion
contracts."' In contrast, courts have generally enforced contract
terms that do not constrict personal use rights."1
Despite the possibility of contractual limits on personal use,
digital publishers have reason to push for expanded copyright
107. See id. at 1246-47.
108. License terms work against piracy and sharing by limiting access and by stopping software modifications designed to thwart copy prevention. Copy prevention is discussed infra notes 120-121 and accompanying text. Terms that abrogate the first sale
doctrine obviously restrict sharing. Except transferring, sublicensing, and leasing, the
other restrictive terms might affect purely individual use of a work. The terms governing disassembling, decompiling, and modifying are especially troubling because they
might contribute to entry barriers blocking legitimate competition. See Julie E. Cohen,
Reverse Engineeringand the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual PropertyImplications of 'Lock-Out" Programs,68 S. CA. L. REv. 1091, 1128 (1995).
109. Statutory preemption requires: (1) the state right in question must be
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of the copyright as
specified by section 106; (2) the right must cover a work that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression; and (3) the work must come within the subject matter definition of
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103. See Goldstein, supra note 62, at § 15.2.
110. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding
unenforceable the provision in a license that requires decompilation or disassembly);
Lemley, supra note 42, at 1248-59. But see ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th
Cir. 1996) (holding that the Copyright Act did not preempt state law enforcement of
shrinkwrap license); WM'rE PAPER, supra note 11, at 58-59; Maureen K ORourke, Copyright Preemption After the Pro Cd Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH.
L. J. 53 (1997).
111. See Lemley, supra note 42, at n.55-59. Specific terms have been voided on the
grounds of unconscionability. Id. at 1254.
112. See Goldstein, supra note 62, at § 15.2.1.2 (stating that contract law is generally immune from preemption). But see Netanel, supra note 22, at 306 (stating that First
Amendment limits and copyright preemption may apply to database access contracts);
Lemley, supra note 42 at 1273-74 (copyright holders should not be allowed to enjoy both
copyright advantages and contract law benefits; they should be forced to choose as is the
case with patents and trade secrets); David Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and
Public Policy: FederalPreemption of Software Licensing ProhibitionsAgainst Reverse Engineering,53 U. PIrr. L. REv. 543, 629 (1992) (contract limits on reverse engineering may
be preempted).
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protection. The advantage of copyright law is that it provides
more generous remedies than contract law. A successful copyright plaintiff routinely gets injunctive relief (often including a
preliminary injunction). There are also statutory damages, and
for willful infringement, treble damages and attorneys' fees." 3
4. Enforcement Issues. The authors of the White Paper and
other supporters of copyright expansion advocate three measures to improve enforcement of the copyright on digital works:
allow indirect copyright liability to be imposed on Internet service providers; 14 prohibit technology designed to defeat copy
prevention techniques; 115 and outlaw tampering with copyright
management information." 6 There are a few cases yielding
mixed results on the question of indirect copyright liability of
Internet service providers. 17 Copyright holders hope they can
use indirect liability to find deep pockets to cover losses from
piracy and sharing." 8 In addition, imposing liability for unauthorized sharing complements the policy of indirect liability. Indirect infringement is predicated on the occurrence of direct infringement. Copyright holders will have a much easier time
enforcing their rights against a few large Internet service providers than 9 against the thousands or millions of small scale
infringers.1
113. See Lemley, supra note 42, at 1273.
114. See Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1492-99.
115. See McDaniels, supra note 7 (H.R. 2441 prohibits "black boxes" that are used
to circumvent technical protection for computer programs. H.R. 2441 would prohibit
goods and services with the primary purpose or effect of circumventing technical means
of preventing or inhibiting copyright infringement).
116. See id. at 88 (H.R. 2441 prohibits removal or alteration of copyright management information).
117. See, eg., Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (direct infringement by service provider); Sega Enter. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (indirect liability); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (no indirect liability).
118. See McDaniels, supra note 7, at 90 ("[The Software Publishers Association] relies on current copyright law-including liability for indirect infringement-to protect
hundreds of software companies from piracy.. .).
119. Besides any direct benefit to copyright holders from contributory infringement
suits, the threat of liability might help copyright holders in their broader contest with
Internet service providers. These are the two industry groups that will most profit from
the rise of the Internet. Contributory infringement might become a bargaining chip in a
political deal concerning property rights on the Internet. The threat of lawsuit might
also be used to induce service providers to monitor users to detect and prevent copyright
infringement. See Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1488; Why Internet Service Providers
Should be Copyright Guardians,Software Law Bull., May 1996, at 78. See generally
Goldstein, supra note 62, at § 6.2.1.1. The WHrrE PAPER states that the service providers
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The other two measures have been considered by Congress.
Copy prevention techniques use software and sometimes special
hardwarb or media to stop copying. 20 These methods are quite
effective in stopping copying for the purpose of sharing. They
have been less effective in stopping piracy. One reason is that
technological countermeasures can usually be developed to circumvent the copy prevention technique. Copyright management
information is used to track the disposition of copyrighted works
once they leave the possession of the copyright holder.31 The information is valuable evidence of infringement and can be used
to combat piracy.

U.

FACILITATING PRICE DISCRIMINATION

A. Price DiscriminationFundamentals
Economists have analyzed numerous sophisticated marketing strategies. At the core, many turn out to be types of price
discrimination. Price discrimination means that consumers of an
identical product are charged different prices by the same seller,
or that consumers of similar products made by the same seller
are charged a price differential unrelated to cost.12 The advan-

tage of price discrimination to the seller compared to a uniform
sale price is that more revenue is generated.123 In the ideal case
of perfect price discrimination, every customer is charged her
maximum willingness to pay for the items she purchases.
The issue of price discrimination was prominent in ProCD v
Zeidenberg.12 ProCD manufactured and sold CD ROM telephone
directories. The defendant Zeidenberg violated a condition in his
license that limited him to consumer uses. He copied the directories and used them to make his own product that he marketed
in competition with ProCD. In his opinion, Judge Easterbrook
explained how ProCD discriminated:
are in "the position to know the identity and activities of their subscribers and to stop
unlawful activities: See WHrrE PAPER, supra note 11, at 117. However, the service providers claim that they would have difficulty identifying infringing material. Id at 115-16.
120. See infra notes 174-214 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 225-37 and accompanying text.
122. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A producer of
movies segments the market by time, releasing first to theaters, then to pay-per-view
services, next to the videotape and laser disc market, and finally to cable and commercial

TV.").

123. Speaking of price discrimination, an antitrust casebook says "[t]here is no
more profitable way to sell a product." MILTON HANDLER, ET AL., TRADE REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1221 (4th ed. 1997).
124. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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. is much more valuable to some

users than to others. The combination of names, addresses, and [SIC]
codes enables manufacturers to compile lists of potential customers ....
People with nothing to sell could use the database as a substitute for
calling long distance information, or as a way to look up old friends who
have moved to unknown towns, or just as [an] electronic substitute for
the local phone book. ProCD decided to engage in price discrimination,
selling its database to the general public for personal use at a low price
(approximately $150 for the set of five discs) while selling information to
the trade for a higher price. It has adopted some intermediate strategies
too: access to the SelectPhoneTM database is available via the America
On- line service for the price America Online charges to its clients (approximately $3 per hour), but this service has been tailored to be useful
I
only to the general public. m

Effective price condition requires: (1) measurement of consumer preferences; (2) a means to stop arbitrage by favored consumers; and (3) market power. 26 Are the conditions for price
discrimination met in ProCD? The passage above illustrates how
the seller measures preferences. Buyers are segmented into commercial and consumer categories. Judge Easterbrook explains
that commercial buyers have higher valuations. Elsewhere in
the opinion he explains that a term in the software license precludes consumer buyers from making commercial use of the
product. Such a term limits arbitrage. One can only speculate
about whether ProCD has sufficient market power to successfully discriminate. Judge Easterbrook comments that ProCD has
rivals. Market power declines as the number of rivals increases.127 But a firm does not have to be a monopolist to price
discriminate. Some measure of market power is provided by the
copyright which protects the search engine used in the software
and the high fixed cost of selecting and maintaining the
database. Time will tell. Persistent discriminatory pricing suggests sufficient market power.
Missing from the list of conditions is any mention of compliance with antitrust law. Price discrimination is not effectively
125. Id. at 1449.
126. See generally JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSrRIAL ORGANIZATION 133-52
(1988).
127. Id. at 220-21. Generally, publishers will have rivals selling related but not
equivalent works. In economic jargon publishers usually operate in differentiated product markets. Id at 212. Product differentiation gives some measure of market power and
may be sufficient to support price discrimination. There are two factors that may limit
the market power of digital publishers, and thereby limit price discrimination. First, dig-

ital technology may encourage entry into the publishing industry. Second, the profits
from broader price discrimination may also encourage entry.
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regulated. The Robinson-Patman Act outlaws price discrimination in certain cases, but "it will not apply to just those cases in
which systematic price discrimination is most likely to exist and
to have potent economic effects."12 Three important limitations
are: it applies only to physical commodities; 129 it applies to sales
but not leases;130 and it does not cover discrimination involving
quality variations. 131 The few antitrust cases involving intellec32
tual property and price discrimination do not have much bite.'
B. Preference Measurement
Sellers have devised ingenious methods of measuring buyers' valuations. They must be ingenious because most buyers
hide their valuations. In a negotiated transaction, the seller can
observe general demographic characteristics but cannot force a
prospective buyer to divulge her valuation any more than the
buyer could force the seller to divulge his cost. In anonymous
mass market transactions, the seller does not even observe the
age or gender of the buyer. Sellers use what information they
can glean from buyers to support inferences about valuations.
When inferences are weak and the cost of gathering information
is too high, then price discrimination may not be worth the
bother.
Economists use a three way classification scheme for price
discrimination depending on how preferences are measured.' 33
In third degree price discrimination, price differentials are tied
to a characteristic of a buyer that is correlated with the buyer's
valuation. An example is a senior citizen who gets a discounted
movie ticket.'3 The seller observes the characteristic and infers
that on average this type of buyer has a lower valuation. In second degree price discrimination, price differentials are tied to
actions chosen by the buyer. The seller believes that certain actions reflect the preferences of a low valuation buyer and other
128. HANDLER ET AL, supra note 123, at 1222.

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1229.

132. In BMI v. CBS, 441 US. 1 (1979), the Court allowed BMI to discriminate in
the blanket licensing of musical compositions. Discrimination was implemented by

charging a royalty that varied with a buyer's revenue. Buyers with higher revenue and
bigger audiences are likely to be willing to pay more for a license. See HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTrrRusT LAW 123 (1985).

133. See, eg., TIROLE, supra note 126, at 135.
134. See id. at 73 (discussing price discrimination over time using examples of first
versus second run movies and hard cover versus paperback books).
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actions reflect the preferences of a high valuation buyer. 135 In
the movie example, a Tuesday night discount illustrates second
degree price discrimination. In first degree price discrimination,
the seller knows or learns the exact valuation of all buyers.
This, of course, is an idealized benchmark.
The distinction between second and third degree discrimination is important because second degree discrimination is usually more costly to implement. The greater cost arises from the
need to get buyers to sort themselves in a manner that makes
discrimination possible. Economists call this a sorting condition. 136 The price and characteristics of the good intended for the
low end of the market must not attract the high end, and the
price and characteristics of the good intended for the high end
must not attract the low end. The sorting condition imposes an
implicit cost on the seller because it restricts the freedom of the
seller to set efficient prices. With third degree price discrimination the seller can choose prices for the two classes of consumers
independently. With second degree price discrimination the
prices are linked. Economic theory shows that a monopoly seller
should set the efficient price for the high valuation consumers
37 This
and an inefficient price for the low valuation consumers.
3
inefficiency yields the implicit cost of sorting.
Second degree price discrimination is common in the
software market. A simple method is to grant a site license. 3 9 A
site license authorizes a customer to install a certain number of
copies of software on stand alone machines at a site, or allow a
certain number of networked users to access the software on a
server. By making licensing fees sensitive to the number of
users at a site, the seller can profitably discriminate as long as
the number of users has a positive correlation to value.
Software publishers also use product design to facilitate second degree price discrimination. Educational versions of
software may sell for a fraction of the price of standard versions.
Sellers disable some of the features in the standard version so
the quality is reduced. A similar strategy is to include documentation and customer support with the standard version and not
135. Easterbrook gives an example in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450
(7th Cir. 1996): "An air carrier sells tickets for less to vacationers than to business travelers, using advance purchase and Saturday-night-stay requirements to distinguish the
categories."
136. They also call it a self-selection or incentive compatibility condition.
137.

See DREw FUDEN3ERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAmE TiHEoRy 246-50 (1991).

138. See id.

139. See CMAx/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
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with the educational version. Buyers who prize quality must pay
more for the standard version, and students who are less sensitive to quality buy the cheaper version. Sorting will not occur
unless the discount is large enough to justify the quality reduction to the low valuation buyers. But the discount cannot be too
large or both types of buyers will purchase the cheap version.
If it is feasible to check student IDs before selling a cheap
version then third degree price discrimination is possible. Comparing optimal second and third degree discrimination: both
lead to the same price for the expensive version, while third degree price discrimination leads to a lower price on the cheap
version and higher profits to the seller. The important intuition
behind the economic theory is that the sorting condition reduces
the seller's freedom and less freedom means lower profit. This
discussion shows that sellers prefer third degree discrimination.
But in many markets sellers are forced to rely on second degree
discrimination because they cannot condition sales terms on directly relevant buyer characteristics.
A more sophisticated version of second degree price discrimination requires metering. In some cases metering can approximate first degree price discrimination. A classic example is provided in the antitrust case International Business Machines v.
United States.14° IBM tied the sales of its tabulator machines to
purchases of punch cards that were used in the machines. The
likely purpose of this tied sale was to implement price discrimination.14 1 Discrimination was accomplished by charging a relatively low price for the tabulators, and a price above the competitive price for the punch cards. The purchase of punch cards
meters (or measures) the frequency of use of the tabulator. The
effect of the tied sale is to charge a high price to those who use
the machine frequently and a low price to infrequent users. IBM
reasonably believed that frequent use was positively correlated
with high valuation.
Suppliers can sometimes directly meter the use of their
product. Photocopy machines have counters that record the
number of copies that have been made. Lease agreements often
charge rates that depend directly on measured usage.1 42 Digital
technology will expand the use of direct metering.'4 For example, rather than selling hard copies of encyclopedias at a fixed
140. 298 US. 131 (1936). See Ward Bowman, lying Arrangements and the Leverage
Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957).
141. See Hovenkamp, supra note 132, at 229-33.
142. Car rental agreements are another familiar example.
143. See infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
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price, a digital publisher could offer access to a digital encyclopedia and charge based on usage. Frequent users pay more for

access and infrequent users pay less. As long as use is linked to
value, metering can implement price discrimination.'"
C. Arbitrage
Arbitrage is limited by many factors; 145 I concentrate on the

role of transaction costs, technology, and law because they are
especially relevant to digital works. Even though arbitrage is

feasible sometimes it does not happen because the transaction
costs are too high. In the movie example, even if the ticket taker

is not very vigilant arbitrage would be limited by the hassle of
setting up a secondary market in movie tickets. Further, thea-

ters would resist arbitrage by limiting ticket sales to a small
number per customer. In a digital world where it may be possi-

ble to buy individual songs or newspaper articles or photographs
for pennies, small scale arbitrage might be too costly and large
scale arbitrage'4 too easily detected to be feasible.
When quality differentials are the source of price discrimination, arbitrage may be blocked by technology. As described
above, educational discounts accompany software that has limited features compared to the higher priced version. Arbitrage is
only possible if an educational user can alter the software to
add or restore the missing features at a cost less than the dis144. There are other purposes served by metering. Usage information determines a
lessor's maintenance schedule. A producer of a variety of products can alter the product
mix based on usage information. According to Hovenkamp, tied sales generally can serve

many other purposes besides price discrimination. Often a particular marketing practice
can simultaneously advance many goals for the seller. HOVENKAIUP, supra note 132, at
233-36.
145. In some cases arbitrage is intrinsically infeasible. Services are a good illustration. The favored customer of a hair stylist cannot purchase an extra haircut for resale.
The favored customer of a dentist cannot resell a filling. Younger movie patrons cannot
use senior movie tickets as long as the tickets indicate that they are for senior use and
the ticket taker is vigilant. Similarly, appropriately marked Tuesday night tickets cannot be used on Friday night. Transportation cost is an important factor preventing arbitrage when sellers price discriminate between different geographic markets. This is of
little relevance to copyrighted works since transportation costs range from small to trivial- Suppliers often lease rather than sell computer hardware and software. A lessee is
not allowed to purchase and resell computer services, so arbitrage is impossible. See
JoHN SHEPARD W=LEY JR. ET. AL., The Leasing Monopolist, 37 UCLA L. Rzv. 693, 717-18

(1990) ("By leasing rather than selling, the monopolist can retain control over the machines, prevent arbitrage, and thus succeed in price discrimination").
146. Arbitrage must be distinguished from piracy. Under the first sale doctrine resale on any scale should be protected as long as authorized copies are resold. To stop
large scale arbitrage sellers are likely to insist on contractual limits on resale.
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criminatory price differential. 147
New digital distribution technologies promise to limit arbitrage opportunities for digital works. Many transactions involving copyrighted works are being converted from sales of goods to
sales of services. Text published in encyclopedias or legal digests
can be resold, but a subscription to a database cannot.148 Videotapes can be resold but video that is delivered over the Internet
by streaming technology cannot. 149 On the other hand, the transaction costs that block arbitrage will fall as digital commerce
appears.
The possibility of contract or copyright lawsuits raises the
barrier to arbitrage of copyrighted works. The link between the
first sale doctrine and arbitrage is obvious. If favored buyers can
purchase a work and then sell or lease it to disfavored buyers
then price discrimination may be defeated. Contract restrictions
on resale or other transfers deter arbitrage.
Contract terms can impede arbitrage in other ways. In
ProCD a field of use restriction in the software contract did the
job.150 Customers were sorted into the commercial and consumer
categories and charged different prices. The favored consumer
buyers were discouraged from making commercial use of the
database by the threat of contract litigation.1 51 The tying contract in IBM was designed to prevent high valuation customers
from buying low cost punch cards in the open market. Contracts
often limit the modification of software or the movement (migration) of software from one platform to another. One purpose of
147. Besides the technical challenge, a would-be arbitrager may face licensing
terms that ban alterations to the software. Similarly, the auto industry is well known
for setting much higher mark-ups on luxury cars than on economy cars. Arbitrage is impossible because high value customers cannot buy an economy car and add the luxury
features on their own.
148. More precisely, the first sale doctrine applies to the owner of an encyclopedia
or digest, but not to the database subscriber. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 62, at § 5.6.1.
149. See infra notes 187-95 and accompanying text.
150. Easterbrook explains that preventing arbitrage is necessary for price discrimination:
To make price discrimination work ... [vendors of computer software] must be
able to control arbitrage ....
Anyone can walk into a retail store and buy a
box. Customers do not wear tags saying "commercial user" or "consumer user"
Anyway, even a commercial-user-detector at the door would not work, because
a consumer could buy the software and resell to a commercial user. That arbitrage would break down the price discrimination...
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
151. A more direct contractual approach to limiting arbitrage is simply to prohibit
resale. A familiar example is price discrimination directed at airline passengers. Airline
contracts which prohibit resale, coupled with FAA security regulations calling for identification checks, make arbitrage very difficult.
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this limitation is to reduce arbitrage possibilities. 152 For example, an application program like a statistics package can be designed to run on a DOS or UNIX operating system. The UNIX
buyers tend to have more powerful machines and higher valuations for the software. If the price charged for UNIX versions is
higher, then UNIX buyers may want to purchase a DOS version
and modify it to run on UNIX. This arbitrage can be deterred if
the price differential is less than the cost of modification. But
the seller might want a larger price differential which makes
the contract limitation valuable.
Ill.

COPYRIGHT LAw, DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND PROFIT

The argument for expansion of copyright protection of digital works that I presented is premised on the assumption that
developments in digital technology will erode profits to copyright
holders. The premise is probably false. Digital technology will
encourage more price discrimination 5 3 and greater profits to
copyright holders regardless of the direction of copyright law in
the digital world. Digital technology is also likely to create new
markets and new profit opportunities for authors and publishers.' 5 ' In contrast, the growth of unauthorized sharing and
piracy can be mitigated by copy prevention and copy tracking
technology.155 Furthermore, the losses from unauthorized sharing of digital works and the probability that the practice will
grow are likely overstated. 5 6 Finally, it is important to realize
that the most significant economic effect of expanded copyright
protection of digital works will be to facilitate even more price
152. A second, very different role is played by limits on modification and migration.

These limits reduce the useful lifetime of certain software. The limit on migration keeps
a buyer from moving the software to new hardware even if she deletes the version on

the old hardware. The limit on modification might impair use of software in combination
with a new operating system. Such contract induced obsolescence can increase profits to

a durable goods monopolist See generally T1ROLE, supra note 126.
153. In this Article, I only discuss discrimination against end-users, but discrimination against input purchasers is also likely. For example, multimedia producers may
need authorization from many copyright holders covering relatively small excerpts. They
may wind up turning to some collective rights organization like the Authors' Union.
They might be subject to the kind of price discrimination used by music licensing organizations against broadcasters and bars.
154. Digital technology will improve the marketing of copyrighted works. One marketing improvement is more effective price discrimination. Others include better research, product design, selection and advertising which will all flow from better information. The resulting profit gains could easily offset any losses from increased
unauthorized sharing or piracy.
155. See text accompanying notes 174-214, 219-37.
156. See text accompanying notes 166-71.
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discrimination. The ostensible goal may be to restore lost profits, but the result is likely to be a vast gain in profits by copyright holders.
A. Price Discriminationand Profit
Copyright expansion and digital technology will create a
windfall of profit for copyright holders. Both make arbitrage
harder and preference measurement easier, which facilitates
more price discrimination. More price discrimination means
more profit to the sellers of digital works.
Price discrimination is a potent method of increasing a
seller's profit, because the seller can squeeze more revenue out
of existing customers. 157 Consider an example. Assume that
there are two types of buyers in the market for a particular
novel. Type H has a high valuation of $20 for the novel, and
type L has a low valuation of $10. There are two million type H
buyers and six million type L buyers. Assume that the marginal
cost of printing and distributing the novel is $5. The uniform
monopoly price for the novel is $10 which yields a profit of $40
million.158 A price discriminating monopolist would charge $20
to the H types and $10 to the L types which yields a profit of
$60 million. 15 9 Thus profit rises by 50%.
A second example is illustrated in Figure 1. It shows a
smooth downward sloping demand curve. Unlike the first. example, buyers' valuations take on a continuum of values. Again I
assume that the marginal. cost (given by the line XY) of a novel
is $5. The uniform monopoly price is shown as M. The profit is
the area of the rectangle VWXM. Next suppose that first degree
price discrimination is possible so that the monopolist can identify the maximum willingness to pay of every user. The monopolist charges a different price to every user corresponding to their
position on the demand curve. The monopolist serves every consumer up to the one with a valuation of $5. The profit is the
area of the triangle XYZ. Price discrimination doubles the profit
of the seller.
157. Output and production costs might rise given price discrimination. Also, there
are costs of implementing price discrimination, but a producer would not choose to discriminate unless he expected discrimination to raise his profit.
158. This profit is the gross of the fixed costs of production like writing, editing,
and typesetting.
159. I assume that the monopolist can identify the two types, and arbitrage is not
possible.
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Digital technology will directly facilitate price discrimination by allowing low cost metering of the usage of digital
works. 160 Technology for metering a customer's usage of a product occurs outside of the digital realm. Photocopy machines are
equipped with counters that record the number of copies made.
This information is useful for maintenance, but it also can be
used to determine charges under a lease agreement. Similarly,
the odometer in a rental car records mileage information that is
useful for maintenance and linked to rental charges. Within the
digital realm, probably every reader of this Article is familiar
with legal research databases. The database providers record information on how much time each user spends on-line and how
many pages of text each user downloads. This information is
useful for managing access to the database and determining its
contents, but it also can be used to determine charges.
In the future, methods like streaming of audio and video or
cryptographic envelopes will make usage metering widespread. 161 Metering systems will allow copyright holders to
charge for every access to and use of their work. 162 Goldstein
160. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 200 (It is now feasible to measure factors like
frequency and duration of the use of a work.); WHml PAPER, supra note 11, at 219; Cohen, supra note 22, at 1038; Netanel, supra note 22, at 295 (digital technology allows
highly refined price discrimination).
161. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 224 (Technologies might emerge that allow copyright holders to charge for the value of each element used not just a time based
charge.) Id. at 28 (musing about the satellite delivery of digital works [celestial jukebox]
facilitated by sophisticated price discrimination).
162. See Elizabeth Corcoran, A DigitalDuel: Whose PropertyIs This? Business and
Wet Cruisers Debate How and Whether Copyright Applies in Cyberspace, WASH. PoST,
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speculates that because new transmission technology will be
able to "keep a record of every selection a subscriber makes, and
the price he paid for it, copyright owners will have a far more
precise measure of the demand for their products than they do
today."163 Improvements in measuring usage allow better measurement of user valuations and lead to more profitable price
discrimination.
Some more good news for copyright holders is that arbitrage
can be discouraged with copy prevention technology. Currently,
music producers use CD-ROMs to distribute music because it is
difficult for the typical user to make digital copies from them.
Electronic game manufacturers sell game cartridges that are
difficult to copy. Soon other techniques will be available to impede personal digital copying.' 6 ' Regardless of whether they
price discriminate, copyright holders will try to stop personal
copying that leads to unauthorized sharing. Sellers charging a
uniform price want to get every user to pay that price. But price
discriminators especially dislike sharing because it is an avenue
for arbitrage. More price discrimination will now be feasible beprevention methods can discourage sharing and
cause copy
165
arbitrage.
Returning now to copyright law, I have shown in Part II
that expanded legal protection of digital works will ease measurement of preferences and discourage arbitrage. To summarize
the impact on preference measurement: field of use restrictions
in copyright licenses segregate buyers by type; and software site
licenses allow the counting of users. An impact on arbitrage
arises because: restriction of the first sale doctrine means less
sharing and fewer arbitrage opportunities; a diminished fair use
doctrine means that users may not be able to decompile, modify,
or migrate software in such a way as to defeat second degree
Sept. 3, 1995, at HI; McDaniels, supra note 7 (software agents could be used to measure
software use on the Internet and collect royalties); Julie F. Cohen, Some Reflections on
Copyright Management Systems and Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12 BEmELEY TECH.
L J. 161 (1997).
163. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 220. See also Cohen, supra note 22, at 1038
(prototype systems now exist that allow monitoring and charging for every use of a copyrighted work).
164. See text accompanying noted 174-214.
165. One factor works against greater profit from price discrimination: entry. New
profit possibilities and publishing technologies might encourage entry of new digital content providers. Entry erodes the market, which reduces profit and makes price discrimination more difficult. See University Establishes Policy to Post-Work on the Internet, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 28, 1997, at A9 (entry of a university into digital publishing of disserta-

tions).
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price discrimination; contract terms may abrogate the personal
use rights that remain and thereby discourage sharing; and prohibition of technology that circumvents copy prevention lessens
opportunities for sharing and arbitrage.
. Would-be price discriminators are delighted by the prospect
of shrinking personal use rights combined with digital metering
technology. These two developments have a complementary effect. To see why suppose that some genre of work X is distributed via some new technology A. It might be the case that technology A allows for easy metering of use of X, but does nothing
to discourage arbitrage. Price discrimination might be enabled
because changes in copyright law cutting back on personal use
rights help the seller block arbitrage. Better measurement is
worthless to a price discriminator who cannot stop arbitrage.
Similarly, there is no reason to price discriminate or try to block
arbitrage if one cannot measure user valuations. Both technology and expansion of copyright could induce new or more elaborate price discrimination on their own, but together they should
lead to much more.
B. Unauthorized Sharing and Profit
Proponents of copyright expansion fear that personal use
rights in the digital age will lead to rampant small-scale, informal sharing and copying that will devastate publishers. 166 There
are three reasons why I doubt that fear will be realized. First,
the loss in profits from personal use is probably exaggerated.
Second, digital technology will not necessarily increase the exercise of personal use rights. Third, technical measures are also
available to restrict exercise of those rights.
Personal use rights limit the distribution rights of a copyright holder. This irritates publishers who would like to have
complete control over distribution channels. 1 7 They complain
that personal copying, lending, and sharing cuts'into sales and
revenue. This seems like an obvious grievance but it is actually
quite complicated. Part of the complaint holds that personal use
cuts sales-that is probably true. Part of the complaint holds
that personal use cuts revenue-that is also probably true, but it
166. See Deborah Shapley, Corporate Web Police Hunt Down E-Pirates, Nuw YORK
Taws, May 19, 1997 at D5. ("The Business Software Alliance estimates that of the 523
million new business software applications used globally in 1996, 225 million, or nearly
one in two are pirated.").
167. Cf GOLDSTEIN, supra note 62, at § 5.6.1 (The relevant principle is that the

distribution right assures the copyright owner no more than the opportunity to realize
the full value of each copy or phonorecord upon its distribution").
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is less clear and less dramatic than people usually think. An unspoken part of the complaint is that personal use cuts distribution cost-unspoken, because it is a benefit to publishers.
Personal use cuts sales because a user does not make a
commercial purchase if they get software, music or video from a
friend. The sales decline might be offset by favorable word-ofmouth advertising associated with personal use that increases
demand. 168 The sales decline is limited because many of the
users who could not get the work from a friend would simply
drop out of the market. 169 Personal use cuts revenue because
sales fall. This cut in revenue might be completely offset by a
higher sales price. If a copyrighted work would sell for $5 per
copy in a world with no sharing, it might sell for $10 in a world
in which every purchaser shares the work with one other person. The total sales revenue is the same. 170 Of course, the price
is not apt to rise to $10 if the purchaser does not charge her
friend and does not fully value her friend's use. 171 Finally, personal use cuts distribution costs, because the purchaser bears
the cost of distributing a copy to her friend and the publisher
avoids this cost. The net effect on the profit of publishers is undoubtedly negative, but the size of the effect is overstated by the
emphasis on sales rather than revenue and cost.

72

Further, this

is just as much a problem for hard copy and analog publishers
as it is for digital publishers.
It is easy to see that the Internet raises the threat of
piracy, but it is not so easy to see that personal use rights will
be exercised more frequently in a digital world. Given the current state of technology, borrowing or sharing a hard copy newspaper or magazine or novel is more likely than borrowing or
sharing the digital equivalent. 73 On the other hand, clipping
168. See, e.g., Thomas Petzinger Jr., Copyright Imbroglio Entangles a Work that
Web Gave Away, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1997, at BI (selections from books available online to increase demand).
169. See Stallman, supra note 29, at 294. Cf. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 896-97 (2d Cir. 1994) (eliminating photocopying at Texaco would

not result in a large increase in journal subscriptions).
170. See Netanel, supra note 22, at 374. Here I am analyzing a market with uniform and not discriminatory prices. Sharing disrupts price discrimination by way of arbitrage. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51.
171. If the purchaser is a business or some other institution the purchasing agent

is more likely to fully account for all users' valuations.
172. See Litman, supra note 2, at 37 (The number of copies made in a digital envi-

ronment is not a good measure of the damages suffered by the copyright holder);
Netanel, supra note 22, at 375.
173. See Religious Tech. Ctr.v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907
F. Supp. 1361, 1378 n.25 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("Until reading a work online becomes as easy
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digital articles and sending them via e-mail is easier than clipping a newspaper or magazine. As video on demand becomes
available it will probably displace personal copying to time-shift
TV programming and trips to the video store. On the other
hand, patrons of a digital library will probably do more personal
copying, and the library will probably avoid purchase of duplicate copies of digital works.
Regardless of people's desire to copy different kinds of media, publishers can control copying of digital works using technical measures that have no counterpart for hardcopy works and
few counterparts for analog works. 174 Publishers might either
prevent copying or make unauthorized copies of digital works
unusable. 175 Movie and music producers have worked in concert
with consumer electronics manufacturers to make it impossible
for ordinary consumers to make useful copies of digital movies
or serial copies of digital music. 176 Software and digital text publishers also have techniques to stop personal copying, although
they are less effective.
When videotape machines began to appear in homes the
first response by movie producers was to sue Sony and other
manufacturers for contributory infringement. Their hope was
that equipment manufacturers would be forced to pay copyright
royalties to cover the cost of personal copying and sharing.
When litigation failed the producers turned to technology. The
sharing of videotape has been effectively controlled by stopping
VCR owners from taping movies using two VCRs, sometimes
called back-to-back recording. 177 A process called Macrovision
protects analog video by embedding a signal onto videotapes
that interferes with copying. 178Movie producers secured the coand convenient as reading a paperback, copyright owners do not have much to fear from
digital browsing and there will not likely be much market effect.").
174. See McDaniels, supra note 7, at 20 (It is expensive and inconvenient for users
to copy from a CD-ROM disk).
175. See Aoki, supra note 37, at 12-13 (copy protection technology).
176. See Terry Costlow, How SCMS scheme works, ELEoToNic ENGINEERING TIMES,
July 31, 1989, at 4.
177. The Macrovision process also can be used to protect pay-per-view movies,
video Compact Disks, and movies released for digital VCRs from copying by analog
VCRs. Digital VCRs are a more thorny problem. See Peter Lambert, Digital chips to
carry Macrovision anti-copy system, MULTICHANNEL NEws, June 6, 1994, at 8, available
in 1994 WL 12927138; Video Copy Protection, Sept. 29, 1997, <http://
www.macrovision.com/vcp.html> (on file with author and the Buffalo Law Review).
178.
See Videocassette Anticopy Process, Sept. 29, 1997 <http://
www.macrovision.com/acp.html> (on file with author and the Buffalo Law Review). The
key to the Macrovision process is the imbedding of a fluctuating electronic signal within
the recording on the video tape to be protected. This signal is not detectable and does
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operation of VCR producers who agreed to design and sell only

VCRs that implement the Macrovision process.
Macrovision set a precedent for inter-industry cooperation

that has been followed for the new Digital Versatile Discs (DVD)
technology.179 Any digital work can be distributed via DVD, in-

cluding video, music, text, and any combination of the three.8 0

Since DVD movies are stored as digital works, the danger of
copying is arguably greater than the danger of copying for analog VHS tapes. DVD units that allow recording could easily be-

come home video production factories. As a result, Hollywood
studios have demanded strong copy prevention technology before
agreeing to release movies to DVD. 181 To protect the content on
DVD discs from digital-to-digital copying, the content of DVD
discs will be encrypted so that the contents cannot be easily cop-

ied directly on to another digital medium.

82

Chips in the DVD

players will decode the encrypted contents and allow play-

back.'8 3 Later DVD decks with recording capabilities will also be

equipped with a special anti-copying chip.' 8 ' If a user tries to record a DVD movie on one of these decks, the anti-copying chip
in the deck will detect the encrypted signal embedded in the

movie and will shut down. 8 5 The DVD
standards also guard
86

against copies from DVD to videotape.
Distribution of video and audio over the Internet instead of
by DVD presents new problems for copyright owners. In essence,
the Internet has the potential to detach digital works from the
not degrade picture quality when the tape is played. However, when an individual attempts to tape the signal using another VCR, the signal results in image and sound deg-

radation including loss of picture quality and color distortion. This effectively renders
the resulting copy unusable for home video playback.
179. See Movie Companies, Drive Makers Agree on Copyright Protection, OPTICAL

MEMORY NEws, Nov. 5, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8328542; John Simpson, Wading
through the DVD hype, COMPUTING CANADA, Mar. 3, 1997, at 42; Paul McGoldrick, At

Last: DVD Is Available To The Consumer, ELECTRONIC DESIGN, Feb. 17, 1997, at 105.
180. See Simpson, supra note 179, at 42; McGoldrick, supra note 179, at 105.
181. Movie Companies, supra note 179.
182. Id.
183. Much Work Remains on DVD Copy Protection,AUDIO Wm,July 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 6828883.
184. Macrovision Eyes Future DVD Copy Shield, CONSUMER ELEcTRoNIcs, Apr. 14,
1997.
185. Id.
186. With respect to digital-to-analog recording, the CPTWG recently agreed to incorporate a new version of the Macrovision process into DVD players. Dennis Taylor,
Firm Aims to Skewer Disc Pirates, THE Bus. J.-SAN JOSE, Feb. 3, 1997, available in
1997 WL 7813859; Digital Video Disc (DVD) Copy Protection Process, Sept. 29, 1997,
<http://www.macrovision.com/dvd.html> (on file with author and the Buffalo Law
Review).
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physical media which have traditionally been used to distribute
digital works. With the Internet, a digital work is simply copied
into memory or onto disk and then played by the user's computer. Copyright owners fear that they will lose revenue if users
are able to make copies of digital works and store them on their
home computers for later retrieval, reuse, and/or further copying
and distribution without the payment of additional revenue to
the copyright holder. On the other hand, copyright owners realize that dispensing with physical media as the primary distribution system for digital works would result in enormous cost savings since the costs of production, shipping and storage would
be eliminated if these works were distributed over the Internet.
One solution is to take advantage of specific distribution
protocols which incorporate means of protecting against copying.
An example is streaming audio and video. Streaming audio and
video are relatively new to the Internet. 8 1 Before streaming was
invented, a user who wanted to listen to an audio clip or to view
a film clip often had to wait a long time for the entire clip to
download to her computer before she could play the clip. 88 Once
the file was downloaded, she typically had a copy of the file accessible on her system which she could redistribute to other
users. By moving to streaming audio and video copyright owners
have been able to solve two problems at once. Instead of waiting
for the entire file to download, the streaming process requests
the work from the remote server, buffers a portion of the file,
and then begins to play the buffered portion while still receiving
the rest of the file from the remote server.189 For the user this
means less wait time since a large portion of the downloading
can be accomplished while the user is already watching the
0
clip. 9
The implications of streaming for copyright protection are
equally impressive. Companies currently developing streaming
applications typically distribute free copies of the software required to listen to or view the audio or video stream. 191 The free
187. The leading company developing streaming audio and video applications, Progressive Networks, Inc., introduced its first version of its RealAudio audio streaming
software in 1995. M. Sharon Baker, ProgressiveNetworks Wins $18 Million in Funding,
PUGET SOUND Bus. J., Dec. 13, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11477543. In 1997, Progressive Networks introduced RealVideo, a streaming application that handles video content.
M. Sharon Baker, ProgressiveNetworks Enters Internet Video Race, PUGET SOUND BUS.
J., Feb. 14, 1997, available on 1997 WL 7329200.
188. See Steve Plain, Streamlining, CoMP. SHOPPER, Dec. 1, 1996, at 620.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See, eg., ProgressiveNetworks Announces RealStorecom, Sept. 5, 1997, <http'/
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player software typically does not include a record option. 192 If a
user wants to be able to record streaming audio or video she
must pay for the full version of the software. 193 Even if she
purchases the full version, however, a copyright owner has the
final say over which portions of a work she can copy. 94 This selective recording allows a copyright owner to determine on his
server whether or not the user can use the player software on
her own computer to copy the audio or video. 9 5 Thus a copyright
owner can ensure that the work is used or enjoyed only once per
purchase.
Software publishers have tried several copy prevention
strategies. In the early 1980s, the computer software industry
relied almost exclusively on the copy prevention strategy in attempts to protect software from unauthorized copying. Often
copy prevention simply relied on computer disks holding a program that could not be copied without special software. 196 In an
era when hard drives were in their infancy, this strategy made
sense. For users without hard drives, possession of the original
physical media was necessary to use the program at all. Even
users who had hard drives were prevented from making additional copies of the program disks,'197 although they could potentially perform multiple installations of the same program. To
prevent the practice of sharing software many manufacturers
not only made the program disks uncopyable, they also required
the user to have the original disk in their computer's disk drive
www.realaudio.com.> (spot: Progressive Networks) (on file with author and the Buffalo
Law Review).
192. For example, RealPlayer from Progressive Networks is available for free
download and allows playback of RealAudio and RealVideo files, but does not allow recording of these files. See Download Replayer 4.0 or RealPlayer Plus 4.0, Sept. 5, 1997,
<http//www.real.comtproducts/player/choice.html> (spot: Progressive Networks) (on file
with author and the Buffalo Law Review).
193. RealPlayer Plus, available for purchase through the Progressive Networks
Web Site, allows users to record RealAudio and RealVideo files if the copyright owner
has designated them as recordable. Id.
194. Progressive Networks refers to this option as Selective Record. Id. See also
PROGRESSIVE NETWORKS, REALAUDIO SERVER ADMINISTRATION AND CONTENT CREATION

GuIDE 198 (1996), available in RealAudio Server Administration and Content Creation
Guide, Sept. 5, 1997, <http-//www.real.com/help/library/> (spot: Progressive Networks)

(on file with author and the Buffalo Law Review).
195. PROGRESSWE NETWORKS, REALAuDno SERVER ADmNmTRATION AND CONTENT CREATION GUIDE 198 (1996).
196. See generally Software Firms Ease Stance on Copies, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRiBUNE, Sept. 6, 1986, at C4 (discussing use of copy protection on software and user response to such protection).
197. Id.

886

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

before they could run the program from their hard drive. 98
The problem with preventing copying of the physical media
was twofold. First, users found the copy protection annoying. 199
Copy protection prevented legitimate copying of the software for
archival and backup purposes."' If anything happened to the
original disks, or if the media itself failed, users were unable to
rely on backup copies of the software they had purchased. 20 1 Resentment in the marketplace was so strong that organizations
started boycotting software that used these types of copy prevention. 20 2 These marketplace revolts against early copy protection were a prime cause of its abandonment by most software
manufacturers by the end of the 1980s. 20 3 A second reason copy
protection on physical media was largely abandoned was the
fact that the copy protection was often easily circumvented. 20 4
The release of a new copy protected program was typically followed by the immediate release of a new "cracking" program ca198. See John C. Dvorak, Jet FighterSimulators: State of the Deadly Art, PC MAG.,
June 27, 1989, at 412; What to Look for in Microcomputer Communications Software,
DATA COMMUNICATIONS, Dec. 1, 1985, at 127.
199. Software Firms ease stance on copies, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, Sept. 6,
1986 at C4. "Of all the software publishing policies seemingly designed specifically to
drive the user up the wall, probably none has proved more irritating than that of copy
protection... 7 Id. The resentment towards copy protection on software seems to remain fairly constant amongst software users. See, ag., Online: XT Battery, PC QUEST,
May 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11752555 ("mhe best software would not use copy
protection at all:); Barry Nance, Reviews: One-Size-Fits-All Code with Lattice C, BYTE,
Nov. 1, 1990, at 245; Ezra Shapiro, Readers Rise to Defend the Mac and Offer Solutions
to System Snafus, BYTE, Apr. 1, 1989, at 129.
200. Sharon Fisher, Special Report: Application Licensing: The Licensing Game,
How Can You Play by the Rules When There are so Many Different Ones?, LAN TuES,
Apr. 1, 1991, at 65.
201. Id. See also Jerry Pournelle, Expert Advice: Computing at Chaos Manor, Disasters and Diversions, the Agony of a Drenched Disk and the Thrill of New CD.ROMs,
BYTE, Oct. 1, 1989, at 115 (recounting the difficulties of getting a replacement disk for
an uncopyable boot disk required to run a program following the destruction of the original boot disk in an uncontrolled orange soda spill).
202. See Fisher, supra note 200, at 65; see also Stan Gibson, SubscriptionsMay
Supplant Piracy, PC WK, Dec. 9, 1996, at 69; Under Pressure,PublisherRemoves Copy
Protection, MACWEEK, Feb. 28, 1989, at 5. In one interesting example, IRS officials were
even quoted as saying that the IRS always either bought software without copy protection or used programs to remove copy protection from the software they purchased. Richard A. Danka, IRS Planning Officer Warns Against Trailblazing, GovERmiENT COMPuTER
NEws, Apr. 1, 1988, at 54.
203. See Melvin, supra note 9, at 5D; Making the Internet Safe for Copyright, SsY.
BOLD REP. ON DESKTOP PUB., July 8, 1996, at 18, available in 1996 WL 9310609; Shapiro,
supra note 199; Software firms ease stance on copies, supra note 194.
204. See Robert Gebeloff, Software PiratesElude Authorities, THE REc., N.N.J., Feb.
10, 1997, at B01.
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pable of defeating the copy protection on the new program.0 5
Software manufacturers and cracking software manufacturers

engaged in a type of arms race over copy protection that ulti-

20 6
mately discouraged copy protection on the physical media.

A more robust copy protection system was adopted by manufacturers of high-end software applications such as CAD
software.2 0 7 Instead of relying on software-based copy protection
these manufacturers chose to use a hardware-based copy protec-

tion. Hardware-based copy protection used physical keys which
were required to unlock software applications. 20 8 These keys,
commonly known as dongles, had to be attached to a port on the
users computer in order for a particular software application to
operate.2 9 During operation the software checks for the presence
210

of the dongle and stops operating if the dongle is not detected.

205. See, eg., Jerry Pournelle, Pournelle Travelling Light, BYrE, Aug. 1, 1994, at
193 (discussing general purpose cracking program called Neverlock); Frank Ruiz, TranSec Product strips copy protection, GovERNMENT COMPUTER NEWS, May 27, 1988, at 56.
There were also companies which produced cracking hardware to defeat copy protection.
See, eg., Michael W. Ecker, Board makes backups of copy protected disks, GOvIERMENT
COMPUTER NEws, Jan. 30, 1987, at 62. The WrTE PAPER supports legislation that would
make it illegal to produce and distribute technology that is designed to defeat anti-copying technology included in software. See supra text accompanying note 16.
206. Copy protection on computer programs becime a subject of ridicule within the
industry by the late 1980s. One tongue-in-cheek definition of copy protection proclaimed
it to be "[a] clever method of preventing incompetent pirates from stealing software and
legitimate customers from using it." Taking a Second Glance at Computer Terminology,
GOVERNMENT COMPUTER NEws, Nov. 21, 1988, at 21. An alternative approach to copy prevention was to allow users to make copies of software contained on various media, but to
implement a system that made resulting copies useless to anyone except the original
purchaser of the program. In its simplest form a user might be prompted by the
software to input a particular word or phrase from the program's manual before being
allowed to perform a particular function or at random interval. Shapiro, supra note 199.
Photocopying obviously created a major problem for software manufacturers who tried
this approach. As photocopying became more advanced, some software manufacturers
began printing their manuals with paper and ink combinations which were difficult to
copy in order to thwart pirates of their software. See Software Confidential, A, Feb. 1,
1989, at 17. (discussing use of No Copi paper by software manufacturers). This method
of photocopy protection has since been discontinued by almost, if not all, software
manufacturers.
207. See, ag., Jon Udell, Reviews: CAD and NetWare 386 Join Forces, BYTE, Dec. 1,
1990, at 182.
208. See Alexander Wolfe, Piratesprey on the Net, ELECTRoNIc ENGINEERING TMs,
Dec. 2, 1996, at 32; see generally <http:/www.aks.com/hasp/hasp.htm.> (The use of dongles to prevent copying of software is a common practice among high-end applications.)
Dave Methvin & Alex Dunbar, Rainbow Technologies Inc.: Sentinelscribe, PC Wm, May
27, 1991, at 111; Owen W. Linzmayer, Unconventional Dongles' Help Deter Privacy, Protect Intellectual Property, MAcINTOSH NEWS, Apr. 23, 1990, at 27.
209. See Methvin & Dunbar, supra note 208.
210. Id.
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Hardware-based copy protection was designed to deter all but
the most determined pirates. A potential pirate would have to
duplicate both the software and the hardware key in order to
use unauthorized copies of the application software protected by
the key.21 Despite the apparent strengths of hardware-based
to high-end apcopy protection, its use today remains 2confined
2
plications such as networking software. '
Software copy prevention in the future probably will not depend on hardware and physical media. Software performs on
general purpose computers unlike digital music and video which
are played on dedicated machines. Software publishers and computer manufacturers are more numerous and heterogeneous
than their counterparts in the movie and music industries. This
makes the prospect of coordinating an inter-industry copy prevention strategy unlikely213 The likely path of copy prevention214is
encryption and other methods based solely on software code.
C. Piracy and Profit
Piracy is not a problem that is new to digital technology.
For my purposes the relevant question is whether digital technology aggravates the problem of piracy, and thereby diminishes
profits to copyright holders. Copyright holders argue that pirates will benefit from the ability to make cheaper and higher
quality copies and from more efficient distribution via the In211. See McDaniels, supra note 7, available in 1996 WL 7135497 (CAD/CAM applications with dongles). There were two major drawbacks to hardware based copy protection. First, the cost of the hardware based copy protection was prohibitively expensive
for use with consumer software programs. See Linzmayer, supra note 206. Second, some
users reacted negatively to the possibility of having to connect multiple dongles to their
systems in order to run more than one dongle protected program. See, e.g., Jerry
Pournelle, Computing at Chaos Manor: Dr. Pournellevs. the Virus, BYTE, July 1, 1988, at
197.
212. See, eg., Richard Goering, Workstations in Turmoil, ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING
TImss, Mar. 3, 1997, at 18; Steve Gold, Jaguar Offers Free LAN Network Monitor
Software On Web, NEwsnYrEs NEws NETwoRK, Jan. 20, 1997, available in 1997 WL
7970633. The recent introduction of cheaper alternatives to dongles, however, may bring
hardware-based copy protection into the consumer marketplace. See Buttons Join Fight
Against Pirates, AUTOMATIC I.D. NEWS, Feb. 1, 1997, at 12, available in 1997 WL
8591302.
213. Industry members have created a trade association called the Software Publishers Association which has been one of the key supporters of the WHITE PAPER and its
goal of making cracking software and hardware illegal. See McDaniels, supra note 7. If
cracking software and hardware are made illegal, we may see a resurgence of copy prevention strategy with respect to digital works in general and computer software in
particular.
214. See Cohen, supra note 22, at 987.
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ternet. The predicted result according to copyright holders will
be more acts of piracy. They also worry that non-traditional pirates who are not profit-motivated will become a significant
factor.
Ultimately, modest changes to copyright law are probably
sufficient to contain the problem of digital piracy.215 Greatly expanded copyright protection is not required because publishers
have a variety of self-help measures available. 216 The first possibility is to avoid digital publication. 21 7 For example, publishers
might not distribute digital copies of novels and photographs.
For many types of work this will not be satisfactory though, because consumers will demand digital works. Furthermore, digital copies can be made from non-digital works. Nonetheless, consumers might not be willing to buy a pirated digital novel or
collection of photographs because they cannot easily turn the
digital file into a book or high quality print.2 18 In addition; the

copyright holder would know that any digital copy of the work is
unauthorized.
Second, there are many technologies for preventing the
copying of digital works.21 9 Anti-copying technology is built into
the new DVD systems, certain CAD systems, and streaming of
audio and video over the Internet. 220 Such technological barriers
might not stop sophisticated and determined pirates, but they
are apt to be effective against marginal pirates like disgruntled
employees and pranksters.221 In the past, sophisticated pirates
215. I conditionally support an amendment to the Copyright Act that would impose
liability on anyone tampering with copyright management information. Such an amendment would be helpful in building cases against pirates, but it should be drawn carefully
to preserve privacy rights. See generally Cohen, supra note 22 (describing privacy dangers associated with WHITE PAPER proposals to implement copyright management
systems).
216. See generally Dale J. Ream, Copyrighted Works & Computer Networks: Is Protection Possible?, 4 KAN. J.L. & PuB. PoLy 115 (1995).
217. See Ken Kayit & Steve Matalitz, ControllingCybercopies, LEGAL Tms,Apr. 8,
1996 at 38.
218. At least given the current technology available.
219. For example, modem software copy protection may even render the original
software disks unusable if the user tries to make any copies of the software whatsoever.
See, ag., Jeff Senna, Saje Mail 1.2 Provides a Secure Correspondence in Windows, INFoWoRLD, May 27, 1996, at N2, available in 1996 WL 10011563.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 187-95.
221. A lower level of technological protection is provided for Digital Audio Tape
(DAT). Under the Audio Home Recording Act, equipment manufacturers are obliged to
incorporate copy lrevention technology in DAT recorders. Consumers will be able to
make copies from an original DAT tape but will not be able to make usable "serial" copies, i.e., copies from copies. Merely blocking serial copying might have a significant effect
on non-traditional piracy, because it limits availability of source copies and makes distri-
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have been skilled at inventing around copy-prevention technology. Nevertheless copy prevention is apt to give the authorized
publisher at least a substantial lead time advantage over unauthorized competitors. 222 In the future, copy prevention methods
that rely chiefly on encryption might be even more successful in
limiting piracy.223 Professor Netanel contends: "Digital content
providers enjoy an unprecedented capacity, through a combination of contract, digital encryption, and electronic monitoring, to
prevent unauthorized access to and uses
of expression and infor224
mation stored in computer databases."
The third and most effective response to piracy is diligent
enforcement of existing rights. Enforcement depends on a
method to detect unauthorized copies. Copyright holders can
easily recognize the quality differences between bootleg copies
and legitimate copies of analog audiotape or videotape. Since a
pirate can reproduce digital works precisely, copyright holders
need a way to distinguish bootleg digital copies. Unauthorized
copies can be distinguished by examining the copy tracking in22
225
formation embedded in each copy. Digital watermarking, 6
bution more difficult.
222. See Breyer, supra note 36, at 299-302.
223. Encryption, metering and on-line licensing offer the potential to perfectly protect digital works. See WHrra PAPER, supra note 11, at 185-87.
224. See Netanel, supra note 22, at 384.
225. A prevalent example of tracking is the often seen requirement that a user
enter her name and company information when installing new software on her system.
See Diane Danielle, Software Copy Protection: What's In a Name?, PC WEEK, Jan. 29,
1990, at 61; Jim Seymour, Upgrading with Lotus 1-2-3 3.0, PC MAG., Oct. 17, 1989, at
79. This information may be copied to the original installation disks so that sharing a
disk also means that the unauthorized copy will bear the original user's name and company name when it is used. Id. at 79. While this system remains a crude way of tracking unauthorized copying, and indeed can be easy to circumvent. Id; Danielle, supra at
61. Future implementations of the copy tracking strategy promise to be both more effective and harder to thwart.
226. See generally Cathy Abes, Can Digital WatermarkingProtect You?, MAGWORLD,
Feb. 1, 1997, at 38; Luisa Simone, Digital Watermarks: Copyright protection for online
artists,PC MAG., Feb. 18, 1997, at 30. Digital watermarking is a method commonly associated with the distribution of digital images. Id. A producer of a digital image can run
the image through software which watermarks the image by making visually imperceptible changes to the colors, intensity, shading, etc. of certain pixels in the image.
Id. The changes can then be decoded by image editing software to reveal the identity of
the author, copyright owner, and specific permissions granted to the user of the work.
Id.
Although digital watermarking and digital fingerprinting make it easier to identify
unauthorized uses of images, they will not prevent deliberate unauthorized copying of
images. Instead, the focus of these systems is on tracking uses of a particular image.
When the image shows up elsewhere without authorization, then the copyright holder
can decide how to enforce their rights with respect to that image.
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digital fingerprinting,22 7 and copyright management systems 228
are all examples of tracking systems. While the details of each
of these systems vary, the underlying principle is generally the
same. Each work protected by these methods is modified to include information that typically identifies the copyright owner
and the buyer of the work.229 As a licensee of the work, the
buyer may or may not be licensed to make copies of the work. If
she makes unauthorized copies of the work and distributes them
to others, the identifying information embedded in the work
gives away the source of the unauthorized copies and exposes
her to liability230 The tracking information can make virtually
irrefutable evidence of unauthorized copying and make detection
of copyright infringement and identification of infringers much
easier.2 1
The newer and more sophisticated copy tracking systems
also offer a form of copy protection. The systems rely on powerful encryption to both protect data from copying and to ensure
that unauthorized copying can be traced to its source. 232 One
prototype, the Electronic Copyright Management System
(ECMS), will encode the work itself in a cryptographic envelope,
or cryptolope for short. 233 At the same time, a plain text index
section will be created so that the content can be searched for
and identified without opening the cryptolope.2 4 A user will be
able to examine the index information without paying for the
content, but will have to pay for a cryptographic key if they
227. See generally Digital image piracy: Fingerprintingwith FBI, CIP EXECUTIVE
BRIEFINGS, July 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8412646. A variant of digital watermarking, digital fingerprinting embeds complex strings of data within the image data. See
Digital image piracy: Fingerprintingwith FBI, CIP ExacuT'Vs BRIEFINGS, July 1, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 8412646. These strings form a digital fingerprint which identifies
owner and copyright information. Id. As with digital watermarking, digital fingerprinting does not perceptibly alter the image it protects. Id. Fingerprints remain with the file
when it is opened, edited, or copied, allowing for tracking of unauthorized copies. Id.
228. See, eg., Otis Port, Halting Highway Robbery on the Internet: It will take
crafty codes to curb the theft of copyright material, Bus. WIK, Oct. 17, 1994, at 212; Simone, supra note 226, at 30.
229. See, e.g., Andrew Sorkin, Digital 'Watermarks' Assert Internet Copyright, N.Y.
Timns, June 30, 1997, at Dll.
230. See, e.g., id.; Simone, supra note 226, at 30; Digital image piracy: Fingerprinting with FBI,supra note 227.
231. See Sorkin, supra note 229. When a watermarked image is opened using certain image editing program the user is alerted to copyright information about the work.
Id. Software is available that will search the Internet and report possible copyright violations. Id.
232. See Cohen, supra note 163; Port, supra note 228, at 212.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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want to see the content itself.23 5 The key will open the
cryptolope and allow various uses depending on the terms of the
license and the amount paid. For example, it would cost more to
be able to view a work 100 times than it would to be able to
view a work only once.
The ability of users to tamper with copy tracking information creates a possible limitation to the copy tracking strategy. If
history is any guide, the producers of digital works may again
find themselves faced with crackers who specialize in removing
copy tracking information from digital works. Encryption tech236
niques are one way a copyright owner can prevent tampering.
In addition, producers of digital works support the White Paper's
provisions criminalizing the production and distribution of technology that is designed to remove
or modify copy tracking infor2 37
mation from digital works.
Besides the ease of copying digital works publishers point to
the Internet as another factor promoting piracy. In my view, Internet distribution does not create intractable enforcement
problems. Digital publishers complain about the sheer number
of possible pirates and the costs of litigation. Large publishers
like Microsoft should be able to find the resources to vigorously
enforce their copyrights against pirates. The example of CocaCola enforcing its trademark rights in thousands of restaurants
and bars across the country demonstrates that a massive pro238
gram of enforcement of intellectual property rights is feasible.
235. Id.
236. See generally id. Copyright owners have also increasingly sought legislative
enactments to prevent buyers and users from tampering with or circumventing copyright
management information and systems. See, e.g., Coalition Forming to Oppose Administration on Proposed Changes to Copyright Law, Info. Law Alert, Oct. 13, 1995, available
in 1995 WL 2400000. While unsuccessful to date at the national level, recent changes to
World Intellectual Property Treaties incorporate anti-circumvention provisions. See Copyright Treaties Hailed by Recording Industry, AuDio Wy-, Dec. 30, 1996, available in
1996 WL 12622125. Australia and New Zealand had previously adopted similar measures. The 1994 New Zealand Copyright Act: A Summary, Music & COPYRIGHT, April 26,
1995, at 11, available in 1995 WL 9764707; Australian Copyright Protection, COMPUTER
FRAUD & SECUrry BULL, Oct. 1, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2577078. The efforts to secure legislative protection seems to be a clear response to a realization that engaging in
an arms race with those who seek to circumvent technological copy protection is a battle
that cannot be won. As one critic of attempts to protect works using encryption stated,
"[E]very computer gamer who has been around for more than a few years knows that no
encryption scheme is perfect. For every code, there is a cracker." Custom Levels and Scenarios Under Siege, COMPUTER GA1,NG WORLD, Jan. 1, 1997, at 20.
237. See Cohen, supra note 22, at 990-91.
238. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Howard Johnson Co., 386 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ga.
1974); David Thompson, Coca-Cola Cop: He's Checking to See if It's the Real Thing,
OMAHA WORLD HERALD, April 23, 1985; John DeWitt, Protecting Intellectual Property
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Smaller software publishers can rely to some extent on the effort of their trade association: the Software Publishers Association (SPA).239 The SPA now polices corporate software licensees
and enforces license agreements through legal action on behalf
of individual software publishers. Publishers can also rely on
new methods for locating acts of piracy. Streaming audio and
video encoders are currently capable of. embedding copyright in241
formation in works distributed via streaming audio and video.
Copyright tracking systems are especially effective when combined with search services that locate files on the Internet that
contain identifying marks. 42 As computers become increasingly
networked, the creation of a copy tracking system that can
"phone home" when an unauthorized copy is made becomes
more feasible.243 Finally, when a publisher locates a source distributing unauthorized copies of a digital work it can go after
the source, and also after the Internet service provider if the
provider does not act to stop infringing transmissions once given
notice. 244
Start-Ups Urged 7b Take Action to Shield Assets, ARiz. Bus. GAZETTE, Dec. 7, 1995, at 15.
ASCAP and BMI have been similarly successful enforcing music performance rights on a
massive scale. See Merges, supra note 28, at 1328-40.
239. To defray the high cost of locating piracy the software manufacturers use the
Software Publishers Association (SPA) to further their interest in preventing unauthorized copying of software. See Ken Wasch, Software Industry Gets Serious About Piracy,
COMPUTER RESELLER NEws, Nov. 7, 1988, at 140. In 1988, Wasch was the executive director of the SPA. Id.
240. Id. The SPA also continues efforts to raise public awareness of the problem of
software piracy. See, eg., Melvin, supra note 9, at 5D.
241. PROGRESSIVE NETwoRKs, REALAUDIo SERVER ADMINISRATmN AND CONTENT CREATION GUmE VERSION 3.0 15 (1996), Oct. 16, 1997, <http:\\www.real.com\help\library\>
(spot: server administration) (on file with author and the Buffalo Law Review).
242. Publishers also use firms that specialize in detecting infringement of intellectual property rights on the Internet. See Deborah Shapley, Corporate Web Police Hunt
Down E-Pirates,N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1997, at D5 (May 19, 1997).
243. At least one company has already implemented such a system to protect highend network administration software. In 1995, a news story surfaced of a copyright infringement case initiated by Performix, Inc. against their competitor Mercury Interactive
Corp. following the receipt by Performix of an e-mail message indicating that a copy of a
Performix program was being installed on a system without authorization. Glenn R.
Simpson, Computers, A '90s Espionage Tale Stars Software Rivals, E-Mail Spy, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 25, 1995, at B1. Performix had included code in their software to send such a
message in case of unauthorized copying or use. Id. This particular message originated
from Mercury Interactive Corp., a digital smoking gun which apparently induced a quick
settlement between the parties. Id. It remains to be seen whether such a system would
be able to survive in a marketplace which appears hostile to such a concept. See David
Bicknell, The Secret Code that Plants the Enemy Within, COMPUTER WEEKLY, Nov. 2,
1995, at 18.
244. See Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services,

894

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

CONCLUSION

Copyright tradition often differentiates private from nonprivate copying. 24 It gives narrower protection to the copyright
holder against private copying because private actions rarely

threaten the productive incentives of authors and publishers. 24
Copyright holders argue that digital technology promotes widespread small scale copying and makes everyone a potential

copyright pirate because digital material can be cheaply and
precisely copied and distributed. 247 Thus they argue the reach of

copyright protection in the digital age should be the same for all
members of the public and all types of copying. 2

A key premise supporting the call for copyright expansion is
that without legal changes the profitability of authorship and
publishing will decline. I have argued that the premise fails. Although some aspects of digital technology make unauthorized
sharing and piracy easier others make it more difficult. A nar-

row reform prohibiting tampering with copyright management
information is probably the only legal change needed to ward off
increased piracy. Sellers who charge uniform prices might see
some kinds of sharing grow and other kinds decline. The overall

economic impact should not be large. Sellers who price discriminate are more likely to see buyers organize to share digital
works in ways that arbitrage against price differentials.
Technology and modest changes in the law can preserve the

dominant position of the copyright holder in the distribution of
the copyrighted work, and that should maintain the requisite incentive to produce the work in the first place. Copyright expanInc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
245. See, eg., Litman, supra note 2, at 41 (proposing "recasting copyright as an exclusive right of commercial exploitation." An infringement would require either (1) making money from someone else's work, or (2) a large scale interference with the ability of
the copyright holder to do so).
246. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 29 (Congress has been "reluctant to extend
copyright into the privacy of the home... "); International News Service v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918) (fashioning the doctrine of misappropriation to prevent the competitive use of news stories by a copier and distinguishing personal use of
the news as still protected); Goldstein, supra note 1, at 150 ("Quite remarkably, in the
detailed revision of the entire [copyright] law, Congress studiously avoided any direct
comment on the single-copy-private-use question" quoting Letter from Justice John Paul
Stevens to Justice Harry Blackmun (Jan. 24, 1983)).
247. See Litman, supra note 2, at 37 (copying technology used to be only in the
hands of potential competitors, but now typical consumers also have access).
248. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 201 ('The challenge for Congress in the age of
[digital transmission] will be to extend liability against private uses more promptly than
it has in the past."); id. at 30; Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1477-78.
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sion that is aimed at curtailing personal copying is not really
necessary to preserve productive incentives to copyright holders.
Even if my judgment is wrong, it is better to err on the side of
users; if serious incentive problems appear they can be dealt
with later.29 It is much harder to take a concession away from
industry than it is to add a burden to users. 250 Furthermore,
ameliorative action should be media or technology specific instead of across the board. Finally, there is a policy option that
does not facilitate price discrimination: a sales tax.2 1 The music
industry and consumer electronics manufacturers reached a legislative compromise concerning the treatment of Digital Audio
Tape (DAT). 25 2 Music producers were concerned that too much
sharing would result from DAT technology which allows consumers to make cheap digital copies of recorded music. The Audio Home Recording Act absolves the equipment manufacturers
of copyright liability, but a tax is imposed on the sale of DAT
players and blank DAT tapes. The proceeds of the tax are distributed to sound recording copyright holders.
Moving beyond the questions of unauthorized sharing and
piracy, I show that digital technology alone, and especially when
augmented by expanded copyright protection will facilitate price
discrimination. Four of the six proposals for expanded protection
of digital works promote price discrimination. Constriction of the
first sale and fair use doctrines, contractual displacement of
those doctrines, and a law prohibiting technology designed to
circumvent copy prevention methods all impede arbitrage. Indirect liability on Internet service providers will not have a clear
effect on price discrimination unless the threat of liability leads
service providers to cooperate with copyright holders in implementing price discrimination. Finally, a law against tampering
249. Copyright holders would respond that early changes in copyright law are advantageous when it comes to negotiating international copyright agreements. See Jaszi,
supra note 19, at 306-07 (criticizing urge to move quickly to influence international
norms).
250. Since consumer interests are more diffuse it is probably harder for consumers
to organize and influence legislation. See generally MANcu OLsoN, THE LOGIC OF COLLEcTrvE ACTION (1965).

251. A similar policy option is a compulsory licensing scheme. See Ream, supra
note 214, at 122.
252. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 162-03. The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
required that digital tape players include a copy limitation feature. The serial copyright
management system (SCMS) allows unlimited copies from the original but prevents copies from copies. The act also imposed a sales tax of 3% on digital tapes and 2% on digital
tape players. The funds from these taxes are distributed to music copyright holders.
Consumers are free to make copies from an original for private noncommercial use. See
iL
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with copyright management information
does not have a direct
25 3
discrimination.
price
on
effect
I conclude by noting that there are as many questions about
the wisdom of expanding copyright that I have not raised as I
have. Proponents of expansion might argue that copyright holders should get more profit. The basis for this argument could either be that current incentives for production and distribution
are too small, or the politically popular mercantilist view that
high-tech, export-oriented industries should be subsidized. 214 Another argument is that broad property rights encourage valuable
efforts by copyright holders to further develop the value of their
intellectual property.25 Various critics of copyright expansion argue that personal use rights support free political speech, journalism, education, and scientific and scholarly research.25 They
might argue that the incentives to gain a copyright are too
large, and that broader dissemination of copyrighted works is
economically optimal.2 7 Further, they might argue that broader
property rights 8to copyright holders amounts to an unfair
wealth transfer2
A final issue that I have touched on tangentially is the
broad normative impact of price discrimination.2 59 Proponents of
copyright expansion can argue that price discrimination is economically efficient. 26 Critics can make counterarguments about
253. Copyright management information may be used in future audits of copyright
usage on the Internet. Such audits could be used to implement blanket licensing agreements that feature price discrimination like the BMI and ASCAP licenses in the music
industry.
254. See Jaszi, supra note 19, at 303-04 (objecting to arguments by American content providers); Robert W. Kastenmeier & David Beier, InternationalTrade and Intellectual Property:Promise, Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285 (1989).
255. See Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner'sDilemma in
Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 855-56 n.13 (1992); Mark A. Lemley,
The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property, 75 Tax L. Buv. 989, 997-99
(1997).
256. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 22, at 985 (broad personal use rights are needed
to protect reader anonymity); Netanel, supra note 22, at 288 (intellectual property creates an asset that supports an independent creative sector, but the property right should
be limited to promote education and transformative use); Elkin-Koren, supra note 38, at
285 (promotion of democratic values).
257. See Litman, supra note 2, at 42-48; Stallman, supra note 29, at 293-04.
258. See Netanel, supra note 22, at 369.
259. Others have noted in passing the mixed effects of digital price discrimination.
See Julie Cohen, supra note 22, at 1018 n.150.
260. See Goldstein, supranote 1, at 178-79. Practices that appear to be, or actually
are, price discrimination might have other beneficial effects unrelated to discrimination
such as risk sharing or the production of information used in maintenance.
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efficiency and point to distributional problems. 261

The simplest and strongest observation about price discrimination is that it increases profit to the seller-else the seller

would refrain from discrimination. Surprisingly, the gains of the
seller do not always come at the expense of the buyers. It may

happen that discrimination increases the amount of surplus
generated by a transaction, leaving consumer welfare unaffected

or even improved. 6 2 This rosy scenario follows from the assumption that a uniform monopoly price would be so high that the

low valuation segment of buyers is driven out of the market. If
that assumption is correct then allowing discrimination brings
new buyers into the market. In the standard model, the high
valuation consumers are unaffected by discrimination since they
continue to pay the original uniform monopoly price, only the
263
low valuation consumers benefit from the new discount price.

Reversing the assumption about who buys under a uniform

monopoly price leads to a gloomier price discrimination scenario.
If both high and low valuation buyers make purchases given a

uniform monopoly price, then discrimination does not increase
output and does not create direct efficiency gains. The high val-

uation buyers will lose surplus because they face a higher price,
while the low valuation buyers are unaffected by discrimination

because they continue to face the old uniform monopoly price.
Adding more realism quickly makes models of price discrimination difficult to analyze. But economists do make some gen261. See Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & EcoN.
293, 301-04 (1970) (explanation of how price discrimination can capture surplus for the
seller of a public good); Netanel, supra note 22, at 295 and n.32 (consumer surplus
transferred to producer by price discrimination).
262. Judge Easterbrook argues that this occurred in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86,
F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996):
If ProCD had to recover all of its costs and make a profit by charging a single
price-that is, if it could not charge more to commercial users than to the general public-it would have to raise the price substantially over $150. The ensuing reduction in sales would harm consumers who value the information at,
say, $200. They get consumer surplus of $50 under the current arrangement
but would cease to buy if the price rose substantially. If because of high elasticity of demand in the consumer segment of the market the only way to make a
profit turned out to be a price attractive to commercial users alone, then all
consumers would lose out- and so would the commercial clients, who would
have to pay more for the listings because ProCD could not obtain any contribution toward costs from the. consumer market.
263. See W. KIP Viscusi ET AL, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION
D ANDAITRUST 279-83
(1992) (Discrimination may increase efficiency by increasing output. This is most clearly
the case when discrimination results in new buyers entering a market who would be
foreclosed from the market by a high uniform price).
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eral claims consistent with the preceding two examples. 26 First,
the seller gains. Second, the low valuation consumers are indifferent or benefit. Third, the high valuation consumers are indifferent or suffer.265 Fourth, price discrimination can increase or
decrease equilibrium output. 266 Fifth, an increase in output is
not sufficient to guarantee that total surplus increases. 267 In addition to the consumption side of the market, price discrimination is also felt indirectly on the production side of the market.
Inefficiency arises from the costs of measuring different customers' valuations, of writing and enforcing contracts that prevent
arbitrage, and of
designing different types of products or distri268
systems.
bution

264. See Tirole, supra note 126, at 137-39. The welfare effects of third degree price
discrimination are: (1) quantity increase is a necessary not sufficient condition for a wel-

fare increase, because discrimination leads to unequal marginal rates of substitution
across consumers; (2) profits rises; and (3) the high elasticity customers benefit (and
they are more likely to be poor). Id.
265. If there are more than two categories of buyers, those with higher valuations
(or more precisely lower elasticity) tend to lose and those with lower valuations (higher
elasticity) tend to gain.
266. An example will demonstrate that possibility. Suppose three low valuation
buyers each want one unit of some good and assign a value of 2 to the good. Suppose a
single high valuation buyer assigns a value of 5 to the first unit of the good and a value
of 2 to the second unit. Under uniform monopoly pricing the profit maximizing price is
2, output is 5, and revenue is 10. Under price discrimination the low valuation buyers
are charged 2, the high valuation buyer is charged 5, output is 4, and revenue is 11.
267. Many lawyers using economic analysis seem to think that output increases
are sure to create surplus increases. That linkage does not hold in general. With regard
to price discrimination the positive efficiency effect from an increase in output may be
offset by a negative efficiency caused by differences in the marginal rates of substitution
between favored and disfavored buyers. See VIscusI, Er AL., supra note 261, at 279-83
(Discrimination causes inefficiency because it makes the marginal rates of substitution
differ across buyers. Disfavored buyers have a higher marginal valuation than favored
buyers. If the marginal unit of output is taken from a favored buyer and given to a disfavored buyer then total surplus rises).
268. See generally, Hovenkamp, supra note 132, at 345.

